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Research on the integration of emotion and cognition has existed for many years 
(Schorr, 2001).  This research has made great strides in establishing that emotion and 
cognition are, in fact, intimately connected, and several computational models have 
emerged that embody these ideas (Ortony et al., 1988; Neal Reilly, 1996; Gratch & 
Marsella, 2004; Hudlicka, 2004).  However, the integrations achieved to date are to some 
extent incomplete.  On the one hand, the claim that cognition is a necessary antecedent to 
at emotion is well established, and specific cognitive mechanisms that support emotion 
have even been established (Smith & Kirby, 2001).  However, the computational 
realizations of this integration have largely been pragmatic.  Thus, if an emotion theory 
claims that some cognitive step must take place, such as determining whether a stimulus 
is relevant to the current goal, then a subsystem is implemented that makes it take place, 
with little consideration of its overall role in cognition and why it must take place.  That 
is, the link between core cognitive functions and emotion has yet to be fully explored. 
Our approach is to start with a theory of cognitive control called PEACTIDM 
(Newell, 1990; pronounced PEE-ACK-TEH-DIM) and show how a set of emotion 
theories called appraisal theories naturally fills in missing pieces in PEACTIDM, while 
PEACTIDM provides the computational structures needed to support appraisal theories.  
PEACTIDM is a set of abstract functional operations that all agents must perform in 
order to generate behavior (the acronym denotes these operators, described in detail 
below:  Perceive, Encode, Attend, Comprehend, Tasking, Intend, Decode, Motor).  While 
PEACTIDM describes the abstract operations, it does not specify the source and types of 
data that these operations manipulate.  We claim that appraisal theories (Roseman & 
Smith, 2001) provide exactly the required data. Conversely, PEACTIDM provides the 
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functional operations missing from appraisal theories.  An important consequence of this 
integration is that appraisals can be generated incrementally, leading to a time course of 
emotions.  This integration is performed within the Soar cognitive architecture (Laird, 
2008), but could equally apply to similar cognitive architectures such as ACT-R 
(Anderson, 2007).  We furthermore show that the integration provides a natural basis for 
understanding the role of mood and feelings.  
The main purpose of this thesis is to explore the feasibility and potential value of 
this integration. Since there are no existing integrations of this kind, a direct comparison 
to alternative approaches is impossible.  Instead, our evaluation focuses on whether the 
integrated model produces behavior that is qualitatively consistent with PEACTIDM and 
appraisal theory.  We will also address Picard’s (1997) list of properties that an emotional 
system should have (Chapter 5). 
While we rely on psychological theories to inform our approach, our emphasis is 
on the functional benefits (in terms of artificial intelligence) that we can derive from this 
theory.  Possible functional benefits might include enhanced memory retrieval, 
physiological preparation for action, and learning.  In this thesis, we explore the use of 
emotion as an intrinsic motivation to drive reinforcement learning.  This exploration is 
carried out in two domains under a variety of conditions in order to tease out the impact 
of various parts of the model (Chapters 7-9).  The integration also results in extensions to 
reinforcement learning, such as the source of intrinsic reward, and automatic setting of 
the learning and exploration rate parameters. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.  In Chapter 2 we provide 
background on cognitive and emotion theories, with a focus on PEACTIDM, Soar and 
Scherer’s (2001) appraisal theory.  In Chapter 3 we describe the unification of these in 
the context of a model of a simple, short task.  In Chapter 4 we describe a slightly more 
complex model of an extended synthetic task, and in Chapter 5 we present an evaluation 
of that model.  Chapter 6 describes related work in the context of our theory.  Chapter 7 
introduces the integration of emotion and reinforcement learning.  Our purpose is to see if 
emotion can be used as the basis of a reward signal to intrinsically motivate the agent.  
Initial results are also presented.  Based on our success there, we decided to explore 
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additional issues.  Would the system scale to a more complex domain?  How do various 
aspects of the system influence the performance?  Specifically, what influence do various 
appraisals have?  Chapter 8 introduces a new, more complex domain in which we explore 
these issues, and also describes revisions to the model based both on our earlier 
experience with the model and demands of the more complex domain.  Chapter 9 
presents a series of experiments designed to explore these issues, along with our 







In this chapter, we describe PEACTIDM, a theory of cognitive control, and 
present background on cognitive theories, particularly Soar, in terms of PEACTIDM.  
We then present background on emotion theories, and make the connection between 
PEACTIDM and appraisal theories as complementary pieces of the cognition/emotion 
integration puzzle. 
2.1 Cognitive systems 
2.1.1 PEACTIDM: An abstract computational theory of cognitive 
control 
PEACTIDM is a theory of cognitive control where cognition is decomposed into 
a set of abstract functional operations (Newell 1990).  PEACTIDM stands for the set of 
eight abstract functional operations hypothesized as the building blocks of immediate 
behavior: Perceive, Encode, Attend, Comprehend, Tasking, Intend, Decode, and Motor.  
These functions are abstract because although many of them may often be primitive 
cognitive acts, they can require additional processing, whose details are not specified by 
Newell’s theory. Furthermore, Newell did not speculate about the actual data processed 
by these functions. 
PEACTIDM was developed from a functional analysis of immediate behavior—
tasks with short timescales where interaction with the environment dominates behavior. It 
is consistent with human data on some tasks (Newell 1990) and prior work in GOMS-like 
paradigms (John, Rosenbloom & Newell 1985). 
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We will describe PEACTIDM via illustration with a simple immediate choice 
response task adapted from a task described by Newell.  (As we demonstrate shortly, 
even a simple example like this can have an emotional component.)  In the task, a subject 
is faced with two lights and two buttons.  The lights are both within the subject’s fovea.  
The subject’s task is to focus on a neutral point between the lights and wait for a light to 
come on.  When a light comes on, the subject must press the button corresponding to that 
light.  The subject gets feedback that the correct button was pressed by the light turning 
off in response to the press.  The subject’s reaction time is the time it takes to turn off the 
light.     
In PEACTIDM, Perceive is the reception of raw sensory inputs.  In this case, the 
subject perceives one of the lights turning on.  Encode is the transformation of that raw 
sensory information into features that can be processed by the rest of cognition.  In this 
example, a representation is created that indicates one light has come on.  Attend is the 
act of attending to a stimulus element.  In this case, it is not an overt eye movement but is 
some type of covert attention that must select the lit light (even though the light is already 
foveated).  Comprehend is the act of transforming a stimulus into a task-specific 
representation (if necessary) and assimilating it into the agent’s current understanding of 
the situation, such as classification or identification.  In our example, the subject verifies 
that one of the two lights has come on (that is, his attention was not drawn by some other 
stimulus). Tasking is the act of setting the task (i.e., the goal) in the internal cognitive 
state.  In our example, Tasking takes place in an earlier cycle before the task begins—the 
subject is already poised, looking at the lights with a finger ready to press a button and 
knows which button to press for which light.  It is via Tasking that Comprehend knows 
what to expect and Intend knows what operation to choose based on the input.  Given the 
task and the comprehension of the stimulus, Intend initiates a response, in this case, 
pressing a button.  Decode translates the response from Intend into a series of motor 
actions.  Motor executes the action; in our example, the pressing of the button.  In 
general, Comprehend, Intend, and Tasking may require an arbitrary amount of processing 
to perform their functions, although in this task very little processing is required to 
support those functions. 
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Figure 2.1: Basic PEACTIDM cycle.  
The agent repeats this cycle forever. The output from a step primarily feeds into the next step, but 
the output of Intend also feeds into the next cycle’s Comprehend.  Tasking (not shown) competes 
with Attend.  Tasking modifies the current goal, which also serves as an input to the Encode and 
Comprehend cycles. 
 
Newell argued that the ordering of PEACTIDM functions is determined largely 
by the data dependencies between the functions (see Figure 2.1).  Perceive must occur 
before Encode, which must occur before Comprehend, which must occur before Intend, 
which must occur before Decode, which must occur before Motor.  In some simple cases, 
the presence of a stimulus is all that is required for the task, and thus the Encoding step 
may be skipped.  Tasking is the most flexible.  In the implementation presented here, 
Tasking competes with Attend.  That is, the agent can either Attend (and thus complete 
the cycle as shown in Figure 2.1), or it can Task (in which case it immediately precedes 
to Perceive to restart the cycle).  An alternative approach has it compete with Intend (see 
section 8.3.2). 
2.1.2 Approaches to cognitive modeling 
Although PEACTIDM describes a set of abstract operations, it does not describe 























modeling suggest different mechanisms. The cognitive architecture approach we pursue 
here decomposes cognition into more primitive computational components that are the 
building blocks for functional capabilities.  The interactions among these components 
give rise to temporal dynamics within the system. A typical cognitive architecture 
consists of memories (both long-term and short-term) with different performance 
characteristics.  For example, memories can differ what type of knowledge is 
stored/learned, how knowledge is represented in the memory, how it is learned, and how 
it is retrieved.  There can also be processing components that combine knowledge, such 
as to select between alternative interpretations or intentions.  Most cognitive architectures 
also have perceptual and motor systems.  Thus, a cognitive architecture provides task-
independent structure and subsystems that is shared across all tasks, while using task-
dependent knowledge to specialize behavior for a given task. Cognitive architectures are 
essentially computational systems for acquiring, encoding and using knowledge. 
A cognitive architecture implements PEACTIDM by implementing the abstract 
operations via a combination of its subsystems and knowledge that directs the 
interactions of those subsystems.  We have chosen Soar, to realize PEACTIDM, although 
it should be possible to implement it in other architectures such as ACT-R (Anderson, 
2007), EPIC (Kieras & Meyer, 1997), or Clarion (Sun, 2006).  
 In section 2.1.4.1 we will sketch how PEACTIDM might be realized in other 
architectures in the context of the immediate choice response task. 
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Figure 2.2: The Structure of Soar. 
 
2.1.3 Soar 
Soar is a cognitive architecture that has been used both for cognitive modeling 
and for developing real-world application of knowledge-rich intelligent systems. Figure 
2.2 is an abstract block diagram of Soar, which shows the major memories (rounded 
edges) and processing modules (square edges). In the bottom middle is Soar’s short-term 
memory (often called its working memory). The short-term memory holds the agent’s 
assessment of the current situation, derived from perception (lower middle) and via 
retrieval of knowledge from its long-term memories. It has three long-term memories: 
procedural (production rules), semantic, and episodic, as well as associative learning 





































return to them in our discussion of future work.  The appraisal detector will be discussed 
in section 3.4. 
Soar avoids the use of syntax-based conflict resolution mechanisms of traditional 
rule-based systems by firing all matched rules in parallel and focusing deliberation on the 
selection and application of operators. Proposed operators are explicitly represented in 
working memory, and deliberation is possible through rules that evaluate and compare 
the proposed operators. Soar follows a decision cycle (Figure 2.3) which begins with an 
Input phase in which the agent gets input from the environment.  This is followed by the 
Propose phase in which rules fire to elaborate knowledge onto the state, and propose and 
compare operators.  Next, based on the structures created by those rules, Soar selects an 
operator in the Decide phase and creates a structure in short-term memory representing 
the chosen operator.  This choice may be determined by the comparison knowledge, or it 
may be random.  Once an operator has been selected, rules with knowledge about how to 
Apply that operator can fire.  Some of these rules may generate output commands.  
Finally, Output is processed (e.g., the world is updated in response to an action). 
 
Figure 2.3: The Soar decision cycle. 
 
Sometimes, there may not be sufficient knowledge to apply an operator.  This is 
called an impasse.  When that happens, Soar creates a substate structure in Short-Term 
Memory.  This structure allows the Soar decision cycle to continue by allowing rules to 
match in the substate leading to the selection and application of suboperators that can 
help the agent resolve the impasse.  For example, it may be that the operator is abstract, 
in that it requires many discrete steps (i.e., suboperators) to implement.  Thus, the 





Decide Apply Output 
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selected.  When the final step completes the application, the impasse is resolved and Soar 
can select a new operator in the top state.  Soar can also learn one or more new rules that 
summarize the processing done in the substate via a process called chunking (Laird, 
Rosenbloom & Newell, 1986), allowing the impasse to be skipped in the future, which 
results in faster processing. 
2.1.4 Implementing PEACTIDM in Soar 
In this section, we walk through the simple immediate choice response task 
presented earlier (section 2.1.1) and describe how it is possible to map PEACTIDM onto 
Soar. This implementation closely following Newell’s (1990) description. 
Recall the task situation: the agent is faced with two lights and two buttons; the 
task is to press the button corresponding to the light that comes on.  Before the task even 
begins, the agent does Tasking, which creates a structure in short-term memory 
describing the goal, which includes a prediction that a light is going to come on.  
Perceive is the reception of raw sensory inputs; in Soar this means that a structure 
describing which light comes on is created in short-term memory.  This structure causes 
Encoding rules in procedural memory to match and generate domain-independent 
augmentations are added (e.g., the light coming on means the agent can make progress in 
the task).  Rules in Soar fire in parallel, so if there were multiple stimuli, an encoded 
structure would be generated for each at the same time.  Attend is implemented as an 
operator; this is natural since PEACTIDM only allows one stimulus to be Attended to at a 
time, and Soar only allows one operator to be selected at a time.  Thus, there will be one 
proposed Attend operator for each stimulus; which one is selected is influenced by the 
Encoded information.  In this task, only one Attend operator is proposed (since there is 
only one stimulus).  Comprehend is implemented as a set of operators; exactly how many 
are required depends on the complexity of the task and situation.  In this task, there is 
only one Comprehend operator, which verifies that the stimulus is what was expected (as 
determined by Tasking earlier).  Intend is implemented as an abstract operator.  Thus, an 
impasse is created and a set of operators that work together resolve the impasse by 
selecting a response (in this task, to push the button) and creating a prediction of the 
outcome of that action (in this task, that the light will turn off).  In Soar, Decode is 
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merely sending the selected action to the output system, and Motor is handled by the 
simulation of the environment. 
Soar naturally supports the various kinds of processing required by PEACTIDM: 
fast Encoding via parallel rule firing, single stimulus selection via operators, and arbitrary 
processing via operator chaining and impasses.  Soar can even learn to compress the 
arbitrary processing via its chunking mechanism, increasing reactivity (see section 3.8 for 
an example). 
2.1.4.1 Implementing PEACTIDM in Other Cognitive Architectures 
As we can see, PEACTIDM fits naturally with Soar.  Earlier, however, we 
claimed that there was no inherent connection between PEACTIDM and Soar, and that 
PEACTIDM could also be implemented in other cognitive architectures such as ACT-R 
(Anderson 2007), EPIC (Kieras & Meyer, 1997), or Clarion (Sun, 2006). 
We will give a brief sketch describing how PEACTIDM might be implemented in 
ACT-R, highlighting the key capabilities necessary to achieve this.  ACT-R is composed 
of several modules, each of which performs a distinct function.  The declarative memory 
module stores a copy of everything the agent thinks about.  These memories can be 
retrieved later via an explicit retrieval, which returns the best partially matching memory.  
The goal module contains the agent’s current goal structure.  The imaginal module is like 
a scratch pad the agent can use to store any structure.  The perceptual and motor modules 
connect the agent to the environment.  Each of these modules has an associated buffer 
that exposes its information to the system (somewhat analogous to Soar’s Short-Term 
Memory).  For example, the goal module’s buffer simply contains the goal structure, 
whereas the declarative memory module’s buffer can contain a cue, which triggers a 
retrieval that overwrites the cue.  A rule module matches rules based on the contents of 
the buffers and selects a single rule to fire next (if multiple rules match, a conflict 
resolution mechanism chooses one). 
Perceive may be naturally implemented via ACT-R’s perceptual module.  In 
general, the necessary ability is to bring external information into the architecture.  
Encode needs the ability to transform or augment this information so that it is in a form 
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that the rest of the system can easily use.  We utilized Soar’s ability to fire multiple rules 
in parallel in order to generate multiple encodings.  ACT-R can only fire one rule at a 
time, making it difficult to map Encoding onto specific cognitive functions in ACT-R.  
Given the level of output of the perceptual systems in ACT-R (e.g., words), a more 
reasonable mapping would be to have Encoding handled by the perceptual module, so 
that when external information is available to cognition, is it already Encoded.  Attend 
requires the ability to choose a single Encoded structure for further processing.  In ACT-
R, since only one rule can fire at a time, a separate rule can be associated with each 
Encoded structure that creates appropriate structures in one of the available buffers 
(either goal or imaginal).  The competition between possible Attend rules in ACT-R is 
analogous to the competition between Attend operators in Soar.  Comprehend can also be 
implemented as a series of rule firings, some of which may induce retrievals from 
declarative memory.  For example, the verify operator in Soar may be implemented as an 
attempt to retrieve a prediction structure that matches the current situation.  This actually 
allows for at least three levels of match: if the retrieval fails, then the prediction was not 
even close, whereas if the retrieval succeeds, then the prediction was at least close.  An 
additional step via a rule can determine if the prediction matches exactly or not.  A 
possible issue in this would be if an old prediction was retrieved, and not the most recent 
one.  If temporal information is stored with a prediction, then a rule may be able to 
determine if this has happened and classify accordingly (e.g., no match at all).  Tasking 
can be implemented as rules or retrievals that ultimately create and modify structures in 
the goal buffer.  Intend may be directly implemented as a rule in ACT-R, or it may be a 
subtask (similar to how Soar uses a substate).  Decode and Motor may be handled by 
ACT-R’s motor module. 
As we can see, some aspects of ACT-R potentially make PEACTIDM more 
difficult to implement (e.g., the Encode function), but other aspects may be more 
realistic, or suggest alternative implementations in Soar.  For example, ACT-R’s 
perceptual and motor modules may improve Perceive and Motor; Soar has been extended 
with similar capabilities before (Chong, 1997), which would improve the realism of 
perception and action modeled in this research. Using ACT-R’s partially matching 
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declarative memory for Comprehend also suggests a similar route for Soar via its 
semantic memory. 
2.1.5 Architectural Requirements of PEACTIDM 
Thus, our usage of PEACTIDM has revealed possible strengths and weaknesses 
in both Soar and ACT-R.  For example, in Soar, we are required to abstract away from 
the details of Perception and Motor, whereas in ACT-R, reliance on the perceptual 
module for Encoding means that ACT-R cannot learn Encoded structures
1
.  In general, 
the requirements of PEACTIDM may expose the strengths and weaknesses of other 
existing architectures as well.  Table 2.1 reviews the architectural requirements for each 
PEACTIDM function and how Soar and ACT-R support them.   
Function Architectural Requirements Soar ACT-R 
Perceive Support perception Abstracted into 
environment 
interface 
Part of perception 
module 




Part of perception 
module 





Comprehend Support arbitrary processing ranging 
from short (e.g., verify) to long (e.g., 
understanding complex relationships) 
Sets of operators, 
possibly in 
impasses 
Sets of rules; 
declarative 
memory 





Intend Support arbitrary processing ranging 
from short (e.g., push button) to long 
(e.g., complex, temporally extended 
action); support creating predictions 
Sets of operators, 
impasses 
Sets of rules 
Decode Expand compact command 
descriptions into complex motor 
sequences; possibly support parallel 





Part of motor 
module 
Motor Support motor execution Abstracted into 
environment 
interface 
Part of motor 
module 
Table 2.1: Summary of the architectural requirements for PEACTIDM. 
 
                                                 
1
 To be clear, we make no attempt to learn Encoded structures in Soar, either, but as Encoding is 
integrated with Soar’s central mechanisms, this exploration is possible without resorting to architectural 
modifications. 
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An additional requirement not listed above is the ability to learn.  In principle, 
learning can take place in all functions except perhaps Perceive and Motor.  Soar and 
ACT-R have comparable learning mechanisms that cover at least many of the kinds of 
learning possible in PEACTIDM.  We discuss learning in our model in section 3.8 and 
chapters 7-9. 
Finally, we can discuss what flexibility an architecture gives up by committing to 
PEACTIDM.  At some level, the answer may be nothing—the functions can be viewed as 
a recasting of existing functionality.  But it does suggest that certain kinds of processing 
would be inappropriate.  For example, it suggests that the architecture should not support 
executing physical actions directly from, say, Comprehend.  Perhaps more generally, it 
suggests that different structures should be involved in different steps (e.g., a 
Comprehend structure is not also a Motor command).  But given that these functions are 
abstract, multiple possible mappings to any architecture are likely to work, and without 
more detailed specifications, it would be difficult to definitively exclude particular 
mappings. 
2.1.6 What PEACTIDM and cognitive architectures provide 
PEACTIDM provides constraints on the structure of processing that are more 
abstract than cognitive architectures like Soar or ACT-R.  While Soar and ACT-R specify 
processing units, storage systems, data representations, and the timing of various 
mechanisms, they are only building blocks and by themselves do not specify how 
behavior is organized to produce immediate behavior. PEACTIDM specifies the abstract 
functions and control that these components must perform in order to produce intelligent 
immediate behavior. 
Some of the key constraints that arise from the combination of PEACTIDM and 
cognitive architectures are: 
 The set of computational primitives that behavior must arise from (Cognitive 
architecture) 
 The temporal dynamics of cognitive processing and behavior (Cognitive 
architecture & PEACTIDM) 
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 The existence of core knowledge and structures that must be reused on all 
tasks (Cognitive architecture & PEACTIDM) 
The principle theoretical gain in positing and appealing to a level of analysis at 
the abstract functional operator level is that it identifies common computational functions 
across a wide range of tasks.   It thus provides a level of description at which a range of 
regularities may be expressed concerning the nature of these functions.  We now exploit 
this level of description by showing how the inputs and outputs that these operators 
require implies that they must in fact constitute an affective system of a kind assumed in 
appraisal theories of emotion. 
2.2 Emotion modeling 
2.2.1 What can emotion provide? 
PEACTIDM and cognitive architectures describe processes and constraints on 
representation and the timescale of those processes, but they do not describe the specific 
knowledge structures that are actually used to produce behavior—it is up to the modeler 
to describe those, and the space of possibilities is large.  Consider PEACTIDM: What 
structures does Encode generate?  Given multiple stimuli, what information does Attend 
use to choose which to focus on?  What information does Comprehend generate?  What 
information does Intend use to generate a response?  We propose that much of the 
information required by PEACTIDM is generated by the same processes that generate 
emotion, and that these processes are, in fact, the PEACTIDM operations themselves.  
The abstract functions of PEACTIDM need information about relevance, goals, 
expectations, and so on, and compute them to carry out their functions.  The results of 
these computations, then, cause an emotional response. 
2.2.2 Introduction to appraisal theories 
The hypothesis that there is a relationship between the way someone interprets a 
situation (along certain dimensions, such as Discrepancy, Outcome Probability, and 
Causal Agency) and the resulting emotional response is a defining characteristic of 
appraisal theories.  Appraisal theories argue that emotions result from the evaluation of 
the relationship between goals and situations along specific dimensions (see Roseman & 
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Smith 2001 for an overview).  For purpose of understanding the functional role of 
emotion in cognitive architectures, appraisal theories are appealing because they are 
naturally described at the cognitive level, as opposed to the neurological or sociological 
levels.  Smith & Lazarus (1990) argued that, in general, emotions allow for a decoupling 
between stimulus and response, which is required to allow organisms to adapt to a 
broader range of situations.  This decoupling, then, meant that more complex cognition 
was required to fill in the gap.  In other words, complex cognition goes hand-in-hand 
with complex emotion.  Thus, it has been claimed that one of the primary functions of 
more complex cognition is to support appraisal generation (Smith & Lazarus, 1990). 
Appraisal theories fit naturally into our immediate choice response task. When the 
subject presses the button, he Encodes the state of the light and Attends to it.  In the 
Comprehend stage, he verifies that the light’s state matches his prediction. Suppose that 
after the first several trials, the experimenter disables the buttons so that the light stays 
turned on even when the correct button is pressed.  When the subject Intends pressing the 
button, he still creates the same prediction—that the light will turn off.  When the subject 
presses the button, though, the light does not turn off.  Thus, when the subject gets to the 
Comprehend step, he will detect a mismatch between the actual state and the expected 
state.  
This mismatch is called Discrepancy from Expectation, and the subject generates 
a structure to represent it. If the subject has high confidence in an unmet prediction, it 
might react differently from when the subject has low confidence in an unmet prediction. 
Thus, when the subject generates the prediction, an Outcome Probably is also generated.  
In this case, since the subject had no reason to suspect that the light would not turn off 
when the correct button was pushed, the Outcome Probability was very high. 
Since the Discrepancy from Expectation in this case conflicts with the Outcome 
Probability, we expect the subject would experience surprise.  The subject may not even 
believe what just occurred, and try to press the button again, going through the same 
steps.  However, the second time through, the Outcome Probability is probably lower, 
and certainly after a few tries, the subject will realize that the button is not functioning.  
Emotionally, the subject’s reaction may vary based on many factors, such as who he 
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thinks is at fault (which we call the Causal Agent).  If he thinks he broke the button, he 
might feel shame.  If he thinks he is being thwarted by the researcher, he might feel anger 
(especially if there was supposed to be some reward based on his performance). 
Appraisal theories are complementary to the general cognitive model we 
described in that they provide a description of the data being processed by cognition.  
Integration with cognitive architecture can provide the mechanisms and processes that 
lead to appraisals and which utilize the results of appraisal (e.g., emotions, moods and 
feelings; see sections 2.2.3 and 4.2). 
2.2.3 Scherer’s appraisal theory 
Just as we have chosen to implement our model in a specific cognitive 
architecture, Soar, we have also chosen a specific appraisal theory to work with: that 
proposed by Scherer (2001). We do not have a strong theoretical commitment to Scherer 
model, and we have chosen it largely because of the extensiveness of the theory. Most 
appraisal theories have six to eight appraisal dimensions, while Scherer’s theory has 
sixteen appraisal dimensions. Thus, in the long run, if we can model Scherer’s theory, 
there is less chance of us missing some important dimension than if we started with a 
simpler, possibly less complete theory. 
Scherer sixteen appraisal dimensions are shown in Table 2.2.  These dimensions 
are divided into four groups: relevance, implication, coping potential and normative 
significance.  The columns are modal emotions—typical labels assigned to regions of 
appraisal space close to the sets of values shown. 
 18 
Table 2.2: A mapping from appraisal dimensions to modal emotions with dimensions grouped by 
function (adapted from Scherer 2001).   
Those dimensions in italics are not implemented in our current model.  Open cells mean all values 
allowed.  Abbreviations: Unfamiliar = Unfamiliarity, Unpredict = Unpredictable, Conducive = 
Conduciveness, med=medium, intent = intentional, neg = negligence, Enjoy=Enjoyment, 















Relevance        
Novelty        
  Suddenness low high/med   low high low 
  Unfamiliar   high  high very 
high 
 
  Unpredict medium high high   high  
Intrinsic 
Pleasantness 
high  very 
low 
    
Goal 
Relevance 
medium high low low high high med 
Implication        















very high very high very 
high 






low     high  
Conducive high very high   low low low 
Urgency very low low med low low high med 
Coping 
potential 
       
Control    high very low very 
low 
 
Power    low very low very 
low 
low 









   very 
low 




   very 
low 
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Shame Guilt Pride 
Relevance        
Novelty        
  Suddenness high low high very 
low 
low   
  Unfamiliar high  high low    
  Unpredict high medium high very 
low 
   
Intrinsic 
Pleasantness 
low       
Goal 
Relevance 
high medium high low high high high 
Implication        
Cause: Agent other/ 
natural 





















high  high low    
Conducive low low low   high high 
Urgency very high medium high low high med low 
Coping 
potential 
       
Control  high high med    
Power very low medium high med    
Adjustment low high high high medium med high 
Normative 
significance 















The Relevance dimensions relate to what the agent should be paying attention to.   
Suddenness is perceptual in nature; it reflects the extent to which a stimulus is intense or 
has a rapid onset.  Unfamiliarity and Unpredictability characterize the stimulus in the 
context of the agent’s experience: Unfamiliarity is the extent to which this stimulus is 
different than other things the agent has seen before, and Unpredictability is the extent to 
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which the stimulus could not have been predicted.  Intrinsic Pleasantness is how pleasant 
the stimulus is, independent of the current goal.  Goal Relevance is how important the 
stimulus is with respect to the current goal (in a good or bad way).  
The implication dimensions describe the agent’s understanding of the situation.  
Causal Agent and Motive describe who caused the situation and why.  Outcome 
Probability and Discrepancy from Expectation are related to explicit predictions about the 
situation; that is, how likely the prediction was thought to be, and to what extent it was 
accurate.  Conduciveness is how good or bad the situation is with respect to the current 
goal.  Urgency describes the extent to which immediate action is required. 
The Coping Potential dimensions describe the agent’s ability to deal with the 
situation.  Control is the extent to which anyone can change the situation, whereas Power 
is the extent to which the agent can change the situation.  Adjustment is the agent’s 
ability to deal with the situation if it doesn’t change. 
Finally, the Normative Significance dimensions describe social aspects of the 
situation.  External Standards Compatibility is the extent to which the situation is in line 
with cultural and social norms, whereas Internal Standards Compatibility is the extent to 
which the situation is in line with personal norms (e.g., personal morals and values). 
Scherer’s model differs from many appraisal theories in that it assumes a 
continuous space of emotion as opposed to categorical emotions.  Like all appraisal 
theories, Scherer provides a mapping from appraisal values to emotion labels, but he 
describes these labels as modal emotions—that is, common parts of the emotion space.  
Given that the majority of existing computational models are categorical (Gratch & 
Marsella, 2004; Neal Reilly, 1996; Hudlicka, 2004), exploring a continuous model may 
help clarify the benefits and challenges of such a model.  Furthermore, while our theory 
is continuous, it would be trivial to add categorical labels to regions if desired.  Indeed, 
we introduce a labeling function later that does this (although we use it purely for 
analysis; see sections 3.4 and 5.1.1). 
Another way in which Scherer’s theory differs from most is that he proposes that 
appraisals are not generated simultaneously.  Rather, he claims that appraisals are 
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generated in the order of the groupings given above for efficiency reasons.  For example, 
there is no sense in wasting resources on computing the implications of a stimulus if the 
stimulus is irrelevant.  We will return to this point after we have described our specific 
model. 
Scherer also proposes a process model describing how, at an abstract level, the 
appraisals are generated and how they influence other cognitive and physiological 
systems, but it does not provide details of all the data needed to compute the appraisals, 
nor the details of those computations.  Our computational model describes the details. 
Since the computational details include new constraints on how the model as a whole 
works, our model differs in some ways from Scherer’s theory.  This arises in part because 
of the need to develop a computational model of generation, and also because of the more 
limited scope of our model.  Scherer’s theory pays some attention to the physiological 
and neurological aspects of emotion, but like most appraisal theories, does not include 
detailed mappings from the theory to specific behavioral data or brain structures.  Our 
model does not include a physiological or neurological model, and does not yet attempt 
to mode indirect influences on cognition or action tendencies.  While these are excellent 
candidates for future work, our primary focus here is on the generation of appraisals in 
the context of PEACTIDM, and how appraisals influence behavior; thus, a symbolic 




Theory and Implementation of Integration 
 
The main theoretical proposal is that cognitive and behavioral control, as 
characterized by PEACTIDM, requires appraisal information, and that this appraisal 
information is computed directly by the PEACTIDM operations themselves.  The 
generation of appraisals, and their accompanying emotional responses, then, is a 
byproduct of the system’s normal operation.   In this section, we provide the details of the 
integration of PEACTIDM and appraisal theory, building on Scherer’s (2001) theory as 
described above (Table 2.2), though it should be possible to apply other comprehensive 
appraisal theories in a similar way. 
In this chapter and Chapter 4, we describe aspects of our theory using examples.  
In this section, we continue to use the simple choice response task described earlier to 
give a detailed account of how this integration is realized. Thus, we address how 
appraisals and emotion are generated and over what time course, how they are 
represented, how emotion intensity is calculated, and the influence of expectations.  
Chapter 4 demonstrates how the model works in a more complex, extended task that we 
will use to demonstrate additional appraisals and introduce mood, feeling and their 
behavioral influences. 
The simple choice response task follows the steps outlined in Table 3.1.  This 
version has been slightly extended past our previous description to show what happens 
immediately following the button push.  The times for Perceive, Decode and Motor are 
taken from Newell (1990).  Steps implemented as operators (as described in section 
2.1.4) take 50 milliseconds (the assumed timing of the Soar decision cycle). 
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Time (ms) PEACTIDM Processing Notes 
0  Light on 
40 Perceive  
90 Encode+Attend  
140 Comprehend Verifies prediction 
190 Intend (to push button) 
240  Impasse 
290  Create prediction 
340  Push button 
420 Decode+Motor Light off 
460 Perceive  
510 Encode+Attend  
560 Comprehend Verifies prediction 
610 Tasking (to mark task complete) 
Table 3.1: PEACTIDM steps to the simple choice reaction task. 
 
To summarize this extended version of the task, the light comes on, and the agent 
Perceives, Encodes and Attends to the light, and Comprehend verifies that this is what is 
expected.  It then Intends to push the corresponding button.  Intend is implemented as an 
abstract operator whose impasse is resolved by a set of operators in Soar that work 
together to both generate the push button command and create a prediction (that the light 
will go off). After this command is decoded and physically executed, the light turns off.  
This change is Perceived, Encoded and Attended, followed by Comprehension.  Finally, 
the agent marks the task complete. 
In the process of performing these PEACTIDM steps for this task, appraisal 
values are generated, which produce an emotional reaction.  In this task, only a subset of 
the appraisals are relevant, namely Suddenness, Goal Relevance, Conduciveness, 
Outcome Probability, and Discrepancy from Expectation.  Figure 3.1 shows the 
relationship between PEACTIDM and appraisal generation and which appraisal 
information influences which steps in the PEACTIDM process. 
Perceive and Encode generate relevance appraisals, which are used by Attend.  
Comprehend generates assessment appraisals which are used by Intend.  Intend generates 
the Outcome Probability appraisal, which is used by Comprehend in the next cycle.  
Tasking (not shown) is influenced by the current emotional state (not shown), which is 
determined by the appraisals.  Critically, our claim is that the PEACTIDM steps require 
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this appraisal information in order to perform their functions, and thus it must be 
generated by earlier steps. 
 
Figure 3.1: The PEACTIDM cycle with corresponding appraisals.   
Suddenness and Unpredictability are actually generated by Perceive, but like other pre-Attend 
appraisals, are not active until Attend. 
 
3.1 Appraisal Values 
The appraisals differ not only in how they are generated, but also in the types and 
ranges of values they can have with some appraisal values being numeric, while others 
are categorical. Table 3.2 shows the ranges of values we have adopted for the appraisals 
in our system. 
Suddenness [0,1] Unpredictability [0,1] 
Goal Relevance [0,1] Discrepancy from Expectation [0,1] 
Intrinsic Pleasantness [-1,1] Outcome Probability [0,1] 
Conduciveness [-1,1] Causal Agent [self, other, nature] 
Control [-1,1] Causal Motive  
[intentional, negligence, chance] Power [-1,1] 


































For the numeric dimensions, most existing computational models use the range 
[0, 1] (e.g. Gratch & Marsella, 2004). The implication is that the 0 end of the range is less 
intense than the 1 end of the range. For some dimensions, this is true: a stimulus with 
Suddenness 1 would be considered more sudden that a stimulus with Suddenness 0. For 
other dimensions, though, being at the “low” end could be just as intense as being at the 
“high” end. For example, if I pass an exam, I will appraise this as high Conduciveness 
and have a strong positive feeling. However, if I fail the exam, I will appraise this as very 
low Conduciveness, (i.e. highly unconducive) and will experience a strong negative 
feeling. Thus, for these dimensions we use the range [-1, 1]—that is, values near zero 
(e.g. not very conducive or very unconducive) would have a low impact on feeling, but 
values near the extremes (e.g. very conducive or very unconducive) would have high 
impact on feeling. 
3.2 Computing the Active Appraisal Frame 
In the following sections, we trace the generation of appraisals in our example. To 
make the calculations easier to follow, we will use extreme values, such as 1.0, for the 
appraisals, even though less extreme values would be more realistic.  
In our example, before the task began (perhaps when waiting for the light to come 
on), the agent engaged in Tasking which did two things: it created a structure 
representing the task and a prediction structure that a light will come on.  This prediction 
structure has an associated Outcome Probability appraisal value, which we assume is the 
extreme value, 1.0.  When the light comes on, Perceive generates a value for the 
Suddenness appraisal, with value 1.0.  Then, during Encoding, a structure is created with 
the following information: which light came on (which is domain-dependent), and 
whether this stimulus is on the path to completing the task.  The fact that a light came on 
leads to a Goal Relevance appraisal value of 1.0. 
The appraisals are stored in an appraisal frame, which is the set of appraisals that 
describe the current situation that the agent is thinking about it (Gratch & Marsella 2004).  
Before an agent Attends to a stimulus, there may be several appraisal frames that have 
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been started—one for each stimulus the agent perceives.  We call these the pre-attentive 
appraisal frames. 
Attend then uses the available appraisal frames to select the stimulus to Attend to. 
For example, the stimulus that is most Sudden may be preferred. (See the connection 
between Encode and Attend in Figure 3.1).  When a stimulus is Attended, a flag marks 
the associated appraisal frame as the active frame. Once a frame becomes active, several 
other appraisals can occur.  This is in line with our hypothesis that Comprehension 
follows Attend, and that Comprehension generates the data necessary for further 
processing (e.g., Intending an action; see the connection between Attend and 
Comprehend and Tasking in Figure 3.1).  Specifically, the calculation that the stimulus is 
on the path to the goal leads to a Conduciveness value of 1.0. 
What distinguishes our use of appraisal frames from Gratch & Marsella (2004) is 
that we use a single active frame to limit which appraisals are generated, whereas they 
have multiple complete frames; computationally, this makes our approach more efficient.  
Additionally, while Gratch & Marsella also use the appraisal frame to inform an 
attention-like process, our approach implies limits on what information can actually 
influence that process. 
3.3 Sequences and Time Courses of Appraisals 
Now that we have described how appraisals are generated, we will discuss the 
implications of that process on the sequencing and time course of appraisals.  Scherer 
(2001) proposes that the appraisals are generated sequentially because the outcomes of 
some appraisals obviate the need for others.  For example, if none of the relevance 
appraisals indicates that a stimulus is interesting, then there is no need to continue 
processing the stimulus.  Our model also imposes sequential constraints (see Figure 3.1), 
but for two reasons, one of which is related to Scherer’s.  Attend will not choose a 
stimulus unless one of the relevance dimensions indicates that it is interesting, much like 
Scherer’s theory describes.  However, additional ordering constraints arise from the flow 
of data in the model.  For example, since Discrepancy from Expectation arises from the 
Comprehension function, it occurs after the Conduciveness appraisal (which is activated 
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upon Attending).  Similarly, the Outcome Probability appraisal is generated in the Intend 
step, which comes after Comprehension.  Thus, while Scherer’s argument for sequential 
appraisal generation centers on efficiency and the wastefulness of generating irrelevant 
appraisals, our data-driven model extends that to also impose an ordering based on data-
driven constraints: the appraisals cannot be generated earlier (regardless of the 
efficiency).  The idea of appraisals being data-driven has been mentioned elsewhere (see 
Roseman & Smith 2001 p.12-13 for a brief overview of this point), but the idea has been 
used to argue that appraisal ordering is not fixed at all.  Data-driven processing combined 
with PEACTIDM implies at least a partial ordering. 
A corollary to this is that some appraisals take longer to generate than others.  In 
the implementation, all appraisals are generated by rules that test features of the agent’s 
internal state, and thus fire as soon as possible.  However, the amount of time it takes to 
generate the required features varies.  As just stated, the Discrepancy from Expectation 
appraisal rule cannot fire until the required information has been generated by 
Comprehend (which in turn requires that the Attend operator has been executed).  A more 
complex model might require an arbitrary amount of processing to generate the 
information necessary so that a Causal Agent appraisal rule can fire.  In general, the 
amount of processing required by the Comprehend, Intend, and Tasking steps to enable 
the generation of various appraisals may be arbitrary, which is consistent with the 
inference vs. appraisal distinction made by Marsella & Gratch (in press).  Thus, the 
model not only implies partially ordered sequences of appraisals, but it also implies 
varying time courses for the generation of those appraisals. 
3.4 Determining the Current Emotion 
Appraisal theories claim that appraisals are precursors to emotion (see Table 2.2).  
Given the theory we have described so far, it may seem that appraisal alone is sufficient.  
However, as we will see in Chapter 4, emotion has functional value beyond appraisal, in 
that it represents situation knowledge in a task-independent form that can be used to 
influence control and hence behavior.  Here we will simply describe the emotion 
mechanism. 
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A mechanism called the Appraisal Detector (Smith & Kirby 2001) processes the 
active frame to determine the current emotion.  It is via this mechanism that the active 
frame affects the rest of the system.  Emotion theories disagree as to how many emotions 
a human can have at once.  Our current model supports one active appraisal frame at a 
time, and thus only one emotion (not to be confused with mood or feeling, which are 
separate; these will be discussed in Chapter 4).  The pre-attentive appraisals generated for 
the other stimuli do not influence the current emotion in our model. 
In many systems (Ortony et al, 1988), the emotion is reported as a label (such as 
anger, sadness, joy, …) with an intensity.  These categorical theories of emotion assume 
that there are a small, fixed number of possible feelings that vary only in intensity.  In our 
model, like in Scherer’s (2001) theory that inspires it, each unique appraisal frame 
corresponds to a unique experience.  Categorical, linguistic labels can be generated by 
segmenting the space of appraisal frames, and we do this for our own analytical purposes. 
However, the current model does not use these labels, and even if it did, at best such 
labels would be a model of how an individual in a particular culture might label the 
emotions.  For example, in the current problem, since Conduciveness and Goal 
Relevance are positive, and other appraisals such as Causal Agent are not being 
considered (which would lead to Pride), the agent’s current emotion would correspond to 
Joy. The actual representation is the active appraisal frame: Suddenness=1.0, Goal 
Relevance=1.0, Outcome Probability=1.0, and Conduciveness=1.0. 
3.5 Calculating Intensity 
In addition to determining an appraisal as a point in a multi-dimensional space (or 
as a category), the system must also determine the intensity.  Intensity is important 
because it summarizes the importance of the emotion, and thus indicates to what degree it 
should influence behavior. Emotions with low intensity are likely to be caused by less 
important stimuli than emotions with high intensity. 
Overall our approach combines the numeric dimensions of the active appraisal 
frame to form a single numeric intensity value; since the categorical dimensions are non-
numeric, they do not participate in the intensity calculation. 
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3.5.1 Criteria 
There are many ways to produce an intensity value from a frame, and although 
there is little theory or empirical evidence to guide us, we define three general criteria for 
an intensity function: 
1) Limited range: Intensity should map onto [0,1]. This is common to most 
existing theories.  
2) No dominant appraisal: No single appraisal value should dominate the intensity 
function; each should contribute to the result but no single value should determine the 
result. This criterion eliminates a commonly used basis for combination: multiplication 
(e.g., Gratch & Marsella, 2004).  One critical problem with multiplication is that if any 
dimension has a zero value, then the intensity will be zero, regardless of the other values. 
3) Realization principle: Expected stimuli should be less intense than unexpected 
stimuli (Neal Reilly 2006). This is in contrast to Gratch & Marsella (2004) where 
intensity is maximized when the likelihood is 1. 
3.5.2 The Intensity Function 
To construct our intensity function, we begin with the last criterion. In our model, 
Likelihood most closely maps onto Outcome Probability (OP). However, rather than 
computing the change in Outcome Probability, we instead rely on the value of 
Discrepancy from Expectation (DE). These dimensions together imply a change in 
likelihood. If outcome probability and discrepancy from expectation are both high, then 
the intensity should be high since expected outcomes were not met. Similarly, if outcome 
probability and discrepancy are both low, then intensity should be high again, because 
something that was considered unlikely actually happened. If outcome probability and 
discrepancy have opposite values, then intensity should be low. (because either a likely 
stimulus occurred or an unlikely stimulus did not occur). This leads us to the first part of 
our function, which we call the surprise factor: 
𝐼 =  1 − 𝑂𝑃  1 − 𝐷𝐸 +  𝑂𝑃 ∙ 𝐷𝐸 … 
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This function has low values when Outcome Probability and Discrepancy are at 
opposite ends of their ranges (because each product will be a combination of a low and 
high value), and high values when they are at the same end (because one of the products 
will be the combination of two high values). For example, if Outcome Probability = .9 
and Discrepancy = .1, then I = .18. Similarly, if Outcome Probability = .9 and 
Discrepancy = .9, then I = .82. 
To meet the first and second criteria, we notice that a simple function that allows 
each dimension to contribute is an average. A sum will not work because it would exceed 
the legal range as defined by the first criterion. To get magnitudes, we take the absolute 
values of those appraisals that can be negative. In general, one might expect that some 
dimensions contribute more than others do in the intensity calculation. In the absence of 
supporting data, however, we will assume all dimensions contribute equally. Thus, we 
normalize the dimensions with a [-1, 1] range
2
. 
We must now combine these two parts. Two obvious candidates are 
multiplication and averaging. We have chosen multiplication. An implication of this is 
that, if there is either no surprise or none of the other appraisals has any magnitude, the 
intensity will be zero.  This does not violate our “no dominate appraisal” criterion, since 
it requires the influence of multiple appraisals in either case.  It also entails a different 
interpretation of the “realization principle” than averaging would—multiplication ensures 
a completely expected outcome results in zero intensity, whereas averaging merely 
implies reduced intensity.  
Thus, for the subset of appraisals we are considering in this thesis, we have: 
𝐼 = [ 1 − 𝑂𝑃  1 − 𝐷𝐸 +  𝑂𝑃 ∙ 𝐷𝐸 ] ∙
𝑆 + 𝑈𝑃 +
 𝐼𝑃 









where OP=Outcome Probability, DE=Discrepancy from Expectation, 
S=Suddenness, UP=Unpredictability, IP=Intrinsic Pleasantness, GR=Goal Relevance, 
                                                 
2
 As described in Chapter 8, this normalization was removed in the revised system. 
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Cond=Conduciveness, Ctrl=Control, P=Power, and num_dims is the number of 
dimensions included in the average (7, if all dimensions have values). 
In those cases where one or more values for appraisals in the averaging part of the 
equation are missing (as in our current simple choice reaction task example), the average 
is taken over the values that are present.  If either Outcome Probability or Discrepancy 
from Expectation is missing, then the present value is multiplied by the averaging part (in 
this model, the Outcome Probability is always present in an active appraisal frame since 
there is always a prediction). 
 
Figure 3.2: The task as split into PEACTIDM stages with the signed emotion intensity at each point 
in time. 
 
3.5.3 Implications of the Intensity Function 
The intensity function is biased so that some classes of emotions are inherently 
more (or less) intense than others. For example, the emotions that Scherer’s theory would 
label as Boredom/Indifference are composed of low values for most dimensions 
combined with high outcome probability and low discrepancy, resulting in low intensity 
(see Table 2.2 for Scherer’s mapping from appraisals to emotions). On the other hand, 
Scherer’s Rage/Hot Anger emotions are composed of mostly high values, with high 


















































































































































with many circumplex models of emotion (see section 8.3.3), which also propose 
different intensities for different emotions, suggesting a bridge between circumplex 
models and appraisal models. 
3.6 Modeling the Task 
Returning to our example, the intensity of the Joy following the light coming on is 
Outcome Probability multiplied by the average of Suddenness, Goal Relevance, and 
Conduciveness.  Since these all have value 1, the intensity is 1.  Figure 3.2 shows the 
entire task in terms of the PEACTIDM stages with the emotion intensity at each point in 
time. 
Next, the agent verifies the prediction in the Comprehend step.  Recall that the 
prediction was created before the task began, and it said that a light would come on.  The 
prediction was accurate, so a value of 0 is generated for Discrepancy from Expectation.  
This causes the intensity of the emotion to drop to 0 because the surprise factor of the 
intensity is 0 (we might now call the emotion boredom). 
Following Comprehend, the agent Intends to push the button.  As described 
earlier, this causes the architecture to generate a prediction that the light will go off when 
the button is pressed, and it generates the command to push the button.  The prediction 
replaces the previous prediction (that the light would come on) and has a new Outcome 
Probability associated with it (again, let’s assume it is 1).  This is followed by Decode 
and Motor with the result that the button is pushed and the light turns off.  This change is 
Perceived, Encoded and Attended with appraisals generated as before, again resulting in a 
positive emotion with an intensity of 1.  Comprehend confirms the prediction, causing the 
intensity to return to 0.  Finally, Tasking marks the task structure as complete. 
3.7 The Revised Task 
When the world behaves as expected, there is very little to get excited about.  
Emotional reactions are often strongest when unexpected things occur.  To explore this, 
we revised the task so that the light does not turn off when the button is pushed.  How 
does this change the appraisals? The first part of the task (up to the pushing of the button) 
is exactly the same so that the Suddenness and Goal Relevance appraisals have values of 
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1, just like before.  However, now when the button is pushed, nothing happens, so that 
when the stimulus (the light) is Attended to, Conduciveness is -1 because the stimulus is 
not on the path to the goal, as shown in Figure 3.3.  The intensity of the emotion is still 1, 
but the valence is negative (because Conduciveness is negative). Our labeling function 
(section 5.1.1) calls this appraisal frame Displeasure.  Comprehend determines that the 
prediction was inaccurate, resulting in a Discrepancy from Expectation value of 1.  Thus, 
whereas before the intensity returned to 0 at this point, it now stays at 1, and thus the 
negative emotion persists (see Figure 3.3).  We can only speculate at what would happen 
next, since the situation is presumably not covered by the task instructions; in our 
version, the agent still does Tasking and marks the task as complete. 
 
Figure 3.3: The revised task as split into PEACTIDM stages with the signed emotion intensity at each 




















































































































































3.8 A Brief Look at Human Data 
Given that we are exploring this simple task for which human timing data exists, 
the question naturally arises: does it match the human data?  To be clear, the goal of this 
thesis is not to match human data.  Rather, it is to explore the integration of cognition and 
emotion, for which virtually no human data exists.  But since we have the opportunity to 
explore the human data, we will do so briefly here. 
The data reported by Newell (1990) states that the average reaction time from 
when the light comes on to when the button is pushed is 350 ms, with considerable 
variance.  This corresponds to the first part of the task as described here.  By looking at 
Table 3.1, we see that the model reported here takes 420 ms.  However, the model 
reported here did not know how to directly implement the Intend function, and thus had 
to impasse and do the required subfunctions in sequence.  Soar has a learning mechanism 
called chunking that can learn new rules based on the results generated during an impasse 
so that, in the future, the impasse can be avoided and the operator, in this case Intend, can 
be implemented directly.  In this case, chunking learns rules that allow the agent to 
generate the push button command and create a prediction in parallel
3
.  This results in the 
following timing: 
Time (ms) PEACTIDM Processing Notes 
0  Light on 
40 Perceive  
90 Encode+Attend  
140 Comprehend Verifies prediction 
190 Intend (Push button and Create prediction) 
270 Decode+Motor Light off 
Table 3.3: Timing of first part of task after chunking. 
 
After chunking, the task actually completes too fast.  In Newell’s (1990) original 
sketch of how Soar would perform this task, an extra “discrimination” operator was 
included after the verify operator in the Comprehend step.  The purpose of this operator 
was to tell which light had actually come on so the proper button could be selected.  
                                                 
3
 We do not use chunking in the rest of the thesis.  This is because the rest of the thesis is not 
concerned with human timing data, and ignoring chunking allows us to avoid dealing with certain chunking 
issues that may arise in more complex models. 
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Adding this to the model would push the timing up to 320 ms, which is considerably 
closer to the human data.  However, in Soar, it was much more natural for this 
information to be generated by the Encode step.  Since this does not depend on an 
operator, it does not take additional time. 
Alternate timings for the steps that result in a closer fit are possible, but to date 
detailed human timing experiments have not been done in this version of Soar, so we do 
not have guidance in refining this model.  Regardless, the takeaway point is that the 
timing data is not grossly off; it is still in the ballpark. 
3.9 Discussion of the model 
The emotional reaction of an agent to the task depends on at least two factors: to 
what extent the things occur as the agent has predicted them to, and what is at stake for 
the agent.  In Figure 3.2, the agent has very brief reactions to the stimulus (in Soar, on the 
order of 50 milliseconds), which immediately go away when the agent realizes that the 
results are consistent with its expectations.  This demonstrates how incrementally 
generated appraisal information leads to the emotion time courses.  In Figure 3.3, when 
the outcome is unexpected, the agent’s reaction is prolonged.  Thus, even for a mundane 
task like pushing a button, emotional responses are possible.  In the example, the 
appraisal values were extreme for demonstrative purposes, which would reflect a 
situation in which the consequences of the agent’s actions are extremely important—such 
as the World Championship of button pushing, or if a large amount of money is riding on 
the agent’s performance. One has only to watch TV game shows where the only action is 
choosing a box to open to see examples of extreme emotional responses for mundane 
actions.   To emulate mundane button pushing, lower appraisal values would be used, 
which would result in little emotional reaction. 
3.10 Summary 
In this section, we demonstrated the integration of PEACTIDM and appraisals in 
our implementation.  This included many details that go beyond PEACTIDM and 
appraisal, including value ranges for appraisals, active appraisal frames, and the 
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calculation of intensity.  Finally, we touched on our model’s relationship to human data 
and showed that, with learning, it is in the ballpark. 
The next chapter describes the model in the context of a task that involves 
multiple actions over time.  At the end of that section will be a discussion of some of the 
implications of the model which apply equally well to this simple model, but which the 
reader may find easier to appreciate in the more complex context.  Hence, that discussion 






 A Non-Learning Model in a More Complex, Extended 
Task 
 
In the previous chapter, we described the integration of PEACTIDM and appraisal 
theory in Soar in the context of a very simple task.  In this section, we extend that model 
to a more complex (but still fairly simple) extended task that utilizes more appraisal 
dimensions.  Unlike the previous task, this task may take an arbitrary number of 
PEACTIDM “cycles” to complete.  This raises new issues, such as how previous 
emotions affect new emotions, and the role of Tasking when the ongoing task may be 
viewed as different subtasks. Addressing these issues will allow us to address qualitative 
questions such as, does the model produce coherent, useful behavior in the long term? Do 
the appraisals affect behavior and vice versa?  Do appraisals have a reasonable (if not 
human-matching) time course?  These and other questions will be addressed in the 
evaluation (Chapter 5). 
For an ongoing task, we have chosen a simple Pacman-like domain called Eaters  
(Figure 4.1) that eliminates complexities of real-world perception and motor actions, 
while supporting tasks that although simple, allow for a range of appraisals and emotions. 
Eaters is a 2-D grid world in which the agent can move from square to square except 
where there is a wall. The agent can sense the contents of the cells immediately to its 
north, south, east and west.  The agent’s task is to move from its starting location to a 
specified goal location.  This may not always be possible, in which case an intelligent 
agent should choose to give up so it can move on to other tasks.  The task ends when the 
agent notices it has achieved the goal or when it gives up.  Later in the thesis (Chapter 8) 
we will present a more complex model. 
 38 
 
Figure 4.1: A screenshot of eaters. 
The agent is the Pacman-like figure at location (3,4), walls are black cells, and open spaces are light-
colored cells.  
 
In terms of PEACTIDM, the agent will need to Perceive its surroundings, 
including information about what lies in each direction (e.g., walls, open spaces), create 
structures representing the encoded form of the input (e.g., some direction is passable and 
whether moving in that direction leads closer to the goal), Attend to one of the encoded 
structures, Comprehend that structure in terms of its current understanding of the 
situation (e.g., is the situation what the agent predicted), Intend an action if possible (e.g., 
if the Attended structure can be acted upon to get closer to the goal), and then perform the 
Intended action (via Decode and Motor).  Tasking will play a role when the agent is 
stuck; for example, it may need to create a subtask to circumvent a wall, or to give up.  
In appraisal theory terms, each choice point (e.g., what to Attend to, what to 
Intend, when to give up) will be guided by emotional information.  Thus, the steps 
preceding these choice points must generate the appraisals that, directly or indirectly, 
influence the choices to be made. 
What follows are the details of how each PEACTIDM function is implemented in 
this model, including how the appraisals fit in. 
4.1 PEACTIDM in the Eaters Domain 
This section describes how PEACTIDM as implemented in Soar is used to 
perform the Eaters task.  Some aspects of these phases are domain-specific (e.g., the 
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stimuli and actions), but most of the core processing (Encode, Comprehend, Tasking) is 
general and taken directly from the previous model. 
4.1.1 Perception and Encoding 
Perception and Encoding generate structures that lead to relevance appraisals used 
by Attend to determine which stimulus to process.  We do not directly model the Perceive 
function.  The Eaters environment provides symbolic inputs to the Soar agent.  Each 
direction (north, south, east and west) is considered a stimulus; thus, a separate structure 
is Encoded for each direction, which includes information such as whether the direction 
is passable, whether it is on the path to the goal or not, the distance to the goal, and 
whether the agent is making progress.  The distance to the goal is an estimate based on 
Manhattan distance and may be incorrect if there are walls between the agent and the 
goal. If the agent is at a goal location, it will have a separate Encoded structure for the 
goal completion. The Encoded structure is fairly general—any task in which there is a 
path to the goal that can be blocked and where there is an estimate of distance to the goal 
can be Encoded in this way. 
Figure 4.2 shows an example that will be used throughout the rest of this section.  
The goal is for the agent to reach location (7,4) (marked by the star) and the agent has 
moved from the west.  The agent will have four encoded structures, one for each cardinal 
direction.  The north, south and west structures will be marked as passable, directly off 
the path (since those directions will increase the distance to the goal), and at a distance of 
4 from the goal.  The east structure will be marked as impassable but directly on the path 
to the goal. 
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Figure 4.2: Encoded structures for each stimulus. 
The star shows the goal location. 
Relevance appraisals are generated directly from these Encoded structures.  The 
north, south, and east stimuli have some Suddenness, whereas the west stimulus has no 
Suddenness (since the agent just came from there).  In any environment, the agent will 
likely have some general expectations about what things to expect, and our agent expects 
there not to be many walls in the world.  Thus, the north, south and west stimuli have low 
Unpredictability, but the east stimulus has a high Unpredicatability.  Our agent is also 
averse to walls (since they only ever get in its way).  Thus, it finds them Intrinsically 
Unpleasant giving the east stimulus a low Intrinsic Unpleasantness value.  Finally, since 
the east direction is on the path to the goal, it is highly Goal Relevant, but the other 
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stimuli are not (Figure 4.3).  Note that, in this model, only one goal or subgoal is active at 
a time, and thus Goal Relevance is computed with respect to that goal. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Pre-attentive appraisal frames for each encoded structure. 
 
4.1.2 Attending 
In general, the agent wants to make progress towards its goal, so stimuli that are 
Goal Relevant should given priority.  However, Sudden or Unpredictable stimuli may 
also require attention, since these may be signals of danger or opportunity that needs to 
be dealt with. This is essentially an exploit versus explore tradeoff.  Finally, stimuli that 
are intrinsically pleasant or unpleasant (independent of the current goal) may also deserve 
attention.  In this model, each stimulus is appraised along the Suddenness, 
Unpredictability, Intrinsic Pleasantness, and Goal Relevance dimensions, determining the 
appraisal frame (Figure 3.1). 
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In this model, the selection of which stimulus is Attended to is a weighted random 
choice, with weights determined by the values of the appraisals just discussed.  Since 
unusual stimuli are more likely to be worthy of Attention, as described above, appraisals 
with more extreme values lead to larger weights; that is, more interesting stimuli are 
more likely to be Attended to.  Thus, the appraisals provide a task-independent language 
for knowledge that can influence control. 
In our example, the north and south Attend proposals have moderate weights, 
whereas the west Attend proposal has a slightly lower weight (since its Suddenness is 
lower).  The east Attend proposal has a higher weight because it is on the path to the goal, 
leading to an appraisal of Goal Relevance, and it has a wall, which is Intrinsically 
Unpleasant.  Thus, the agent is most likely to Attend east. 
4.1.3 Comprehension 
Next, the agent performs the Comprehend function, which adds several additional 
appraisal values to the active frame (Figure 4.4).  The agency of the stimulus is 
determined (in this model, “nature” is always the Causal Agent and “chance” is always 
the Causal Motive).  The Conduciveness is also determined—if the stimulus direction is 
passable and on the path to the goal, it has high Conduciveness, whereas if it is off the 
path or blocked it has low Conduciveness.  The Control and Power appraisals are also 
generated—if a stimulus direction is passable, Control and Power are rated high, whereas 
if the direction is impassable, Control and Power are low.  While this domain is very 
simple, and thus the generation of these appraisal values is very simple, a more complex 
domain would potentially require arbitrary processing to determine values for any of 
these appraisals.  We will not consider such extended processing here. 
In our example, since the agent is Attending to the east stimulus, which is 
impassable but on the path to the goal, it will generate appraisals of low Conduciveness, 
low Power, and low Control (since it can’t walk through walls).  Causal Agency and 
Motive are “nature” and “chance”, as noted above. 
As in the previous model, the agent then Comprehends the stimulus by verifying 
it via comparison to the current prediction (as generated by the previous Intend) leading 
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to the generation of the Discrepancy from Expectation appraisal.  If the stimulus is a 
match, then the Discrepancy from Expectation appraisal is low; if there is not a match, 
then the Discrepancy is high. 
Unlike the previous model, once a stimulus has been verified, the agent performs 
another Comprehend step that determines if further processing is warranted.  This gives 
the agent a chance to “back out” if it determines that processing should not proceed.  That 
is, the agent answers the question, can additional processing of this stimulus lead to an 
action that helps me?  The agent uses a heuristic called dynamic difference reduction to 
make this choice.  Difference reduction (Newell, Shaw & Simon 1960) attempts to take 
internal processing steps to reduce the difference between the current state description 
and the goal state description.  Dynamic difference reduction (Agre 1988) takes the steps 
in the world to avoid the need for increasing amounts of memory to track one’s 
imaginary progress.  Thus, difference reduction leads to plans whereas dynamic 
difference reduction leads to actions.  In our model, if a stimulus can be acted upon (i.e., 
it is associated with a passable direction) and it does not lead directly away from the goal, 
then Comprehension is complete and the agent acts upon it (it does the Intend function).  
Otherwise, the agent chooses a second Comprehend operator, Ignore.  Ignore marks the 
stimulus as processed and allows control to return to Attend, which will choose another 
stimulus to process from the remaining stimuli as above.  This deactivates the appraisal 
frame for the Ignored stimulus. 
In our example, the agent is Attending east, which is a wall.  Comprehend will 
find a mismatch (since our simple model almost always predicts a passable route to the 
goal).  This will trigger an appraisal of high Discrepancy from Expectation, which is 
added to the current frame.  Since there is a wall, the agent cannot directly act upon the 
stimulus, so it then Ignores it.  In fact, the agent is trapped by its goal in this case.  As it 
Attends and Comprehends to each stimulus, it will find that the remaining stimuli lead 
away from the goal.  Thus, Ignore will eliminate all of the remaining stimuli. 
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Figure 4.4: The agent attends East, making that appraisal frame active. 
The Comprehend function adds to this frame.  The agent decides to Ignore this stimulus. 
 
4.1.4 Tasking 
When the agent has no options left, it is forced to engage in Tasking.  This is an 
addition to the previous model which did not engage in Tasking during the task itself 
(only before the task began and at the very end).  Generally speaking, Tasking is about 
managing goals (e.g., creating goals, giving up on goals, etc.).  In this case, the agent 
creates a subtask to get around the blockage.  In general, there are at least two types of 
goals.  One type is abstract—the goal cannot be acted upon directly and must be broken 
down into more concrete components (perhaps many times) until it is in a form that can 
be directly acted upon.  For example, the goal “Go to Work” is very abstract, and must be 
broken down to something that can be directly executed, such as “take a step”.  The other 
type is concrete—the goal can be acted upon directly.  This is the form of goals in this 
model.  When the agent temporarily retasks itself for the purpose of making progress on 
its original goal, we call this subtasking, and we call the new goal structure a subtask. 
The goal that the agent cannot make progress on is to go to (7, 4).  The reason that 
the agent is stuck on this goal is that its control knowledge and task formulation are too 
restrictive.  Movement in any available direction will take it further from the goal, which 
violates its dynamic difference heuristic.  In order to move around the blockage, it needs 
to temporarily get further away from the goal.  Thus, the agent needs to retask and create 
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a goal that is less constraining, allowing it to get further from the main goal, but without 
violating its constraints in the new goal.  The agent does this by defining the step it would 
ideally take—in this case, it would ideally move east to x=4.  It sets this as its new 
subtask.  That is, there is no constraint in the y (north-south) direction. 
When an agent creates a subtask, it records information that gives it some idea of 
whether it is making progress or not.  Specifically, it records the distance to the parent 
task (goal) at that time.  It also tracks the minimum distance it has ever been to the goal 
upon entering a subtask.  If the current distance to the goal is less than the minimum 
distance to the goal, then the subtask is considered a “good” subtask—that is, the agent 
knows that, even though it has to retask, it is making progress towards the goal.  If the 
distance to the goal is not reduced, then the subtask is considered a “bad” subtask—that 
is, the agent cannot tell if it is actually making progress by retasking.  The Encode 
function adds this good/bad subtask information to each Encoded structure, and this 
information influences some of the appraisals. In this model, the Conduciveness appraisal 
is more positive in good subtasks. 
As alluded to above, once the agent has this new subtask, the Encoded stimuli are 
regenerated (since there is a different context for them now) and the agent can then re-
Attend to the stimuli to see if any are now suitable.  The agent can theoretically create an 
arbitrary number of nested subtasks this way, but for the current task it only needs one at 
a time (although it may create several in the course of completing the goal). 
In our example, this is the agent’s first subtask, so it defaults to a good subtask.  
The agent might still Attend to the east stimulus first and ignore it again, but when it 
Attends to, for example, the north stimulus, it will find that it is no longer directly off the 
path to the subtask.  Instead it is now a sideways move (since it neither gets it closer to 
nor further away from x=4).  Thus, the agent determines that this stimulus can be used for 
Intention processing (Figure 4.5). 
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Figure 4.5: The agent creates a subtask to get around the blockage. 
The stars show the possible locations that would solve the subtask.  This causes new encoded 
structures to be created.  The agent Attends north. 
 
4.1.5 Intending 
Once the agent has found a stimulus it can act upon, it performs the Intend 
function, which is also implemented as a Soar operator.  As in the previous model, Intend 
proposes moving in the direction of the stimulus.  It also creates a new prediction 
structure—namely that the next stimulus direction will be passable and on the path to the 
goal (Figure 4.6) in this model, the agent is always optimistic in this way).  If the agent is 
currently one step away from the goal, then it creates a goal achievement prediction.  
Along with the prediction, the agent also generates an Outcome Probability appraisal.  As 
before, the Outcome Probability is tied to the prediction, and thus all appraisal frames in 
the situation that results from an Intend will inherit this same Outcome Probability 
(Figure 3.1). 
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In our example, Intend proposes moving north.  The Intend operator sends a 
command to the environment to move north, and also creates a prediction.  Since it is 
pursuing a subtask, the agent is less confident of its predictions, so it only rates the 
Outcome Probability of this prediction as moderate. 
 
Figure 4.6: The agent Intends moving north. 
 It creates a prediction of the next stimulus it will see. 
 
4.1.6 Decode and Motor 
We do not directly model the Decode and Motor functions.  The model uses 
Soar’s standard method of communicating an action command to the simulated 
environment, which then executes it, leading to a new input state.  For simplicity, in the 
model presented here, actions never fail (e.g., if the agent Attends to a wall, it will Ignore 
it instead of trying to move into it).  However, our work on learning does allow action 
failures (see Chapter 7). 
4.2 Emotion, Mood, and Feeling 
In the previous model, we described how active appraisal frames become 
emotions.  That is still true in this model.  However, since the agent behaves over a long 
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period of time in this task, the question naturally arises, how do emotions affect each 
other over time?  In this section we will introduce mood and feeling.  The functional 
aspects of these will be discussed in section 4.3. 
Recall that some existing computational models attempt to address the issue of 
how an emotion affects a succeeding one (see Chapter 6).  Still, these models, and most 
theories, do not make an explicit distinction between emotion, mood and feelings; some 
only describe emotion (Hudlicka, 2004), some only describe emotion and mood (Gratch 
& Marsella, 2004) and some describe emotion, but mood only vaguely (Smith & Lazarus, 
1990).  One existing distinction made between emotion and mood is in terms of 
timescale: emotions are short-lived while moods tend to last longer (Rosenberg 1998).  
Some physiologically-oriented theories of emotion (Damasio 1994, 2003) distinguish 
between emotions and feelings: emotions have some impact on physiology, and the agent 
perceives or feels these changes, called the agent’s feelings.  That is, feelings are our 
perception of our emotions. 
This distinction between emotion, mood and feeling is not universally accepted; 
indeed, what processes and phenomena are considered “emotional” is a subject of 
considerable debate. In our model, the specific labels are less important than the 
computational processes, structures and connections that make up the model as a whole. 
For example, Frijda et al. (1989) consider action tendencies to be part of emotion, 
whereas in our model we have action tendencies separate from emotion. Nevertheless, 
since the architecture supports the generation of action, and we have added the ability to 
generate emotion, mood, and feeling, the mechanisms are in place to allow an integration 
of these with action.  Indeed, action is partially influenced by feeling in the present model 
(see section 4.3).  That these phenomena are inextricably bound is not debated; how we 
choose label them is an expository convenience. 
In our model, we maintain a distinction between emotion and feeling, and also 
introduce mood. Emotion is the currently-active appraisal frame. In our model, we use a 
simple model of mood, where mood is a weighted average-like aggregation over past 
emotions computed at the individual appraisal level, so that mood is represented as an 
appraisal frame. This initial model of mood captures some of the time course and 
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interactions among emotions, while ignoring many of the complexities of a more 
complete model of mood.  Feeling is the combination of emotion and mood, represented 
as an appraisal frame, augmented by an intensity. Thus, in the previous model, what we 
reported as the agent’s emotion with intensity (e.g., Joy, 1.0) is actually the agent’s 
feeling and feeling intensity.  Since feeling is represented using an appraisal frame, the 
intensity calculation we proposed previously (section 3.5) still applies. 
The remainder of this section contains a lot of details that, while important to 
understanding exactly how the system works, are irrelevant to the big picture, so the 
reader should feel free to skip ahead to section 4.3 on page 58.  
Figure 4.7 shows how the agent generates an appraisal frame (its emotion), which 
interacts with another appraisal frame (its mood) to generate its perceived appraisal frame 
(its feeling). We call these appraisal frames because their structure is a collection of 
appraisal dimensions, not because the agent, via an appraisal process, directly sets the 
contents of them (the agent only directly sets the contents of the emotion frame). When 
necessary, we will distinguish among them by referring to the emotion frame, the mood 
frame, or the feeling frame. This contrasts with most other theories in which emotion, 
mood, and feeling are not distinguished by separate structures. 
The representation of feeling as an appraisal frame is most likely a simplification 
because feelings are the perception of the physiological reactions to the combination of 
mood and emotion (Damasio 1994; 2003). Nonetheless, whatever structure is produced 
will be the basis for intensity, and the analysis we develop below should apply to that 
structure. Non-computational ideas regarding such structure have been proposed (Lambie 
& Marcel 2002).  
Given a feeling frame, the system calculates the intensity of that feeling (using the 
method described in section 3.5). Intensity gives the agent an indication of how important 
a feeling is, and thus helps determine to what extent the feeling should influence 
behavior. 
Thus, the remaining questions are, how is the mood appraisal frame generated, 
and how does the emotion appraisal frame combine with the mood appraisal frame to 
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produce the feeling appraisal frame?  In the creation of the theory, we have tried to rely on 
existing work and data. However, for the level of detail required in a computational 
model, such prior work is limited. Thus, we are faced with numerous decisions where 
there is little or no guidance from the literature. In these cases, we have tried to choose 
the simplest alternative (recognizing that “simplest” can be a subjective concept); that is, 
we are applying Occam’s Razor. Our long-term strategy (beyond this thesis) is to see 
where these simple assumptions fall short, which will indicate where additional 
complexity is required. Thus, the theory we present is likely oversimplified, but it 
provides a starting point for future work. 
We will begin with our model of mood, and then describe how it combines with 
emotion to generate feeling. 
4.2.1 Mood 
In our model, emotion is based on the agent’s appraisal of the current situation 
independent of any historical context. To avoid wild fluctuations in feeling, historical 
context is necessary, but this context should be biased toward those evaluations that are 
temporally relevant. Mood provides this historical context of recent emotions. Thus, we 
make the simple assumption that the mood combines with the current emotion to form the 
feeling that the agent perceives; more complex models are possible, of course. 
To the extent that mood is physiological in nature, there are some phenomena that 
can guide our model. In the undoing effect (Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998), 
physiological changes due to negative emotions return to baseline (the natural state for 
some positive emotions) more quickly when followed by a positive emotion. One 
possible interpretation of this is that the mood “chases” the emotion (i.e. the mood tries to 
change to match the state defined by the emotion), but will still decay on its own if left 
alone. 
Mood starts out neutral (i.e. all zero values). To model the influence of emotion 
on mood, the mood “moves” towards the emotion each time step. In the current model, 
we have adopted a simple approach where the mood moves x% (our current experimental 
value is 10%) of the distance along each dimension towards the emotion in each cycle. 
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Additionally, the system decays mood by y% (experimental value is 1%) each cycle. 
Thus, each emotion influences mood for a theoretically infinite amount of time, but the 
magnitude of the influence decreases exponentially with time.  Therefore, if there were 
no influence of emotion, mood would eventually become neutral. This model is 
summarized in Figure 4.7. 
4.2.2 Combining Mood and Emotion to form Feeling 
In general, the relationship between appraisal frames may be complex with 
interactions among multiple dimensions. However, we have no reason to assume this, so 
instead we simpler assumption that each appraisal dimension in a frame influences only 
the corresponding dimension in the other frame.  
 
Figure 4.7: An emotion frame influences and combines with the mood frame to produce the feeling 
frame, which is perceived by the agent. 
 
Before we can discuss how mood and emotion combine to create feelings, we 
must discuss the nature of the appraisal dimensions and their values that make up the 
frames. 
4.2.3 Value Ranges for Categorical Appraisals 
The value ranges for each appraisal dimension was described in section 3.1.  
However, we need to return to the issue of categorical representation: how is it that 
different categorical values can be combined across frames? 
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To address this issue, we use a numerical representation of the categorical 
appraisals for the purposes of combination. Causal Agent and Causal Motive can each 
take on three values: Self, Other, Nature; and Intentional, Chance, Negligence, 
respectively. Our approach is to convert these categorical values into mutually exclusive 
features, each with its own numeric value in the range [0, 1]. Thus, the original Causal 
Agent feature is expanded into three features: Causal-Agent-Self, Causal-Agent-Other, 
and Causal-Agent-Nature. For the emotion frame, the selected value gets 1 and the others 
get 0. For example, if the value of Causal Agent is nature, then the dimension Causal-
Agent-Nature gets a value of 1 while Causal-Agent-Self and Causal-Agent-Other get 0. 
The values for these dimensions are now numeric and are treated like other numeric 
values so that the mood tracks recent historical values for these dimensions. The feeling 
value is then the combination of these dimensions from the frames, just like the other 
dimensions. However, after combination, multiple categorical values can be non-zero, 
representing confusion about which is the true value. In these cases, the agent perceives 
the categorical value of the dimension with the highest numeric value. Thus, if Causal-
Agent-Self = .4, Causal-Agent-Other = .7, and Causal-Agent-Nature = .2, the agent 
would perceive Causal Agent = Other.  
4.2.4 Criteria for the Combination Function 
There are many options for combining the values of mood and emotion to 
produce a feeling; we introduce several criteria below that such a combination function 
should meet. Simple combination functions such as averaging or multiplication have been 
shown to be inadequate, as our criteria will illustrate. Existing work (Neal Reilly 1996, 
2006) has already provided some relevant criteria; however, that work has been done at 
the more abstract level of emotions of the same kind (e.g. Joy .3 and Joy .2). Our theory 
is defined at a lower level, that of individual appraisal dimensions and their “intensity” 
(e.g. Suddenness .3 and Suddenness .2). However, the criteria defined for these higher-
level models still apply at the lower level, because the criteria are about how to combine 
intensities of the same kind, and are agnostic as to the kinds are. 
We make the simplifying assumption that the dimensions are independent, so our 
combination function takes as input a particular dimension from the mood and emotion 
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frames to produce the corresponding dimension of the feeling frame. This function is 
applied to each dimension of the frames. 
We begin by noting that we want to avoid a large range of inputs from mapping 
onto a small range of outputs because then the agent will not be able to distinguish 
between those inputs, and thus will not be able to form diverse responses. This criterion 
is subjective. 
1) Distinguishability of inputs: Large input ranges should have large output 
ranges. Capping of extreme values may be necessary, but it should have minimal impact. 
Next, we consider constraints from prior work: when combining values of the 
same sign, the result should be further from zero than the input with the largest 
magnitude, but less than or equal to the sum of the inputs (Neal Reilly 1996, 2006). The 
intuition is that the values should build on each other, but the combination should not be 
more than the parts. For example, if the mood’s Suddenness value is .3 and the emotion’s 
Suddenness value is .5, the feeling’s Suddenness value should be at least .5 but no more 
than .8. 
For values of opposite signs, the result should be closer to zero than the maximum 
magnitude, but be at least the sum of the inputs. Furthermore, the result should be further 
from zero than the sum of the results. The intuition is that the smaller value is dragging 
down the larger value, but the amount of the reduction should be no more than the 
magnitude of the smaller value. For example, if mood’s Conduciveness is .3 and 
emotion’s Conduciveness is -.5, the result should be between -.5 and -.2. 
We can state the above by defining the combining function C, which has inputs 
vemotion and vmood: 
2) Limited range: C(vemotion, vmood) should be between the input with the maximum 
magnitude and the sum of the inputs. 
Another issue is that, if possible, the value should not go out of scale. This can 
happen with middle values combined with a strict sum (e.g. .6 and .6). Values can always 
be capped, but capping middle values means the agent will be unable to distinguish 
among a large set of possible inputs, which violates our first criterion. Thus, our next 
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criterion is that the combination should not be linear (Neal Reilly, 2006). While C(.5, .5) 
should be much less than 1, C(.1, .1) can be very close to .2. The intuition is that low-
intensity stimuli can result in a moderate intensity reaction, but moderate-intensity stimuli 
should not result in extreme intensity reactions. That is: 
3) Non-linear: For small inputs, C is nearly additive, but for large inputs, C is 
closer to a max. Put another way, for small values the derivative of C can be close to 1, 
but for large values, the derivative of C should be closer to 0. 
We also identify several properties that enforce symmetry on the function. These 
properties do not result from any intuition or data, but rather represent reasonable first 
guesses given the lack of information. That is, these are default assumptions and not hard 
constraints. We would be satisfied with a theory that violated these criteria so long as the 
theory recognized the implications of the bias. For example, here may be some basis for a 
positivity bias (Diener & Diener 1996), but it is not clear whether such a bias belongs in 
the combination function or in the processes that generate the emotion frame. 
4) Symmetry around 0: C(x, 0) = C(0, x) = x. If the mood or emotion input is 0, 
then the other input dominates. If they are both zero, then the result should be zero. 
5) Symmetry of opposite values: C(x, -x) = 0. The mood and emotion can cancel 
each other out. 
6) Symmetry of all values: C(x, y) = C(y, x). The mood and emotion have equal 
influence on the feeling. 
4.2.5 The Combination Function 
As a starting point, we will use Neal Reilly’s (2006) proposed function for 
combining intensity values of the same kind, and then modifying it as necessary to meet 
our criteria: 




This function was designed to deal only with positive values. For most of those 
values, the function meets criterion 2 (limited range) and 3 (non-linear). The log 
combination ensures that the result is at least the max value, but no more than the sum. 
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Further, the derivative of the log is near 1 for small values, but decreases for larger 
values. For example, I(.1, .1) = .2, but I(.5, .5) = .6. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the function fails criterion 2 (limited range) at the lower 
extreme (I(0, .1) = .15), 4 (symmetry around 0; I(0, .1) = .15). The function does fulfill 
criterion 6 (symmetry of all values) for positive values. Criterion 5 (symmetry of opposite 
values) does not really apply since the function does not deal with negative values. 
The problems with this function can be fixed. To deal with negative values 
(criterion 5), we introduce a Sign function and absolute values. The absolute values allow 
us to work with the magnitudes of the inputs, while the Sign function allows us to restore 
the signs that were removed by the absolute values. To do this, we break the function into 
two parts: the sum part and the log part. The sum part treats the exponent as a magnitude, 
but applies the original sign before including the value in the sum (see function below). 
To center the function at 0 (criterion 4), we recognize that we need to end up 
taking the log of 1 (to get 0). If each input is 0, then the result of the exponent will be 1, 
and thus the sum part will be 2. To fix this, we subtract 1 from each magnitude of the 
sum (so the sum will be 0 for zero-valued inputs), and then add the Sign of the sum to the 
sum before taking the log (to maintain symmetry). 
We originally chose b=e instead of 2 because the resulting values are less extreme 
near the edges of the input range, which helps meet criterion 1 (distinguishability of 
inputs). However, this function still fails criterion 1. The log scale of the function causes 
the result of an extreme input value and nearly any other input value of opposite sign to 
fall into a very narrow range. For example, C(.9, -.1) = .89998, whereas C(.9, -.5) = 
.89816—nearly the same value. To fix this, we introduce a piecewise function that varies 
b depending on the inputs. If the signs are equal, then b=e. If the signs are opposite, then 
b=1.1, which spreads out the resulting values. For example, C(.9, -.1) = -.85453, whereas 
C(.9, -.5) = .58561. 
The final function is shown below. A complete example showing mood and 




𝐶 𝑣𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑑 , 𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  = 0.1 ∙ 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆 ∙ log𝑏  𝑆 + 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆   
where                     𝑆 =   𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑣 ∙  𝑏10∙ 𝑣 − 1  
𝑣=𝑣𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑑 ,𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
and             𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑣 =  
1 if 𝑣 ≥ 0
−1 else
 
and                          𝑏 =  
𝑒 if 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑣𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑑  = 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 )
1.1 else
 
If 𝐶 𝑣𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑑 , 𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  >    1 then 𝐶 𝑣𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑑 , 𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  =    1
If 𝐶 𝑣𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑑 , 𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  < −1 then 𝐶 𝑣𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑑 , 𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  = −1
 
 
4.2.6 Discussion of the Combination Function 
The combination function, together with the intensity function we presented 
earlier, can sometimes lead to unexpected results. Even though the combination function 
has a building effect (i.e. if the inputs have the same sign, the magnitude of the result will 
be at least as large as the magnitude of the largest input), this will not necessarily result in 
a higher the intensity for the feeling. Given the way Outcome Probability and 
Discrepancy from Expectation influence intensity via the surprise factor, even if both of 
those values go up, the intensity may actually go down. For example, suppose the 
Discrepancy and Outcome Probability for the feeling are both .1 (and assume all other 
dimensions were 1.0). This would lead to an intensity of .82. However, if both of these 
dimensions then increased to .2, the intensity would fall to .68. 
Unlike other models (Neal Reilly, 1996; Gratch & Marsella, 2004; Hudlicka, 
2004), the mood and feeling processes do not combine emotions; they combine 
individual appraisals.  This could lead to unexpected feelings.  For example, an emotion 
best described as elation-joy combined with a mood best described as anxiety-worry can 
result in a feeling best described as displeasure-disgust.  This is an interesting prediction 
of the model that we have not yet investigated. 
Given the lack of relevant data on which to base our theory, rather than present 
comparative results, we instead demonstrate the system’s behavior. First, we give a 
complete example showing the output of the combination and intensity functions and 
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discuss its consequences. Then we show actual feeling intensity data from the Eaters 
domain that demonstrates the realization principle.  
 
Table 4.1 shows a complete example of mood and emotion frames combining to create a 
feeling frame, along with the intensity of each frame. While the agent only perceives the 
intensity of the feeling frame, it can be useful to generate intensities for the other frames 
to aid our understanding of the system. 
 
Table 4.1: An example combination of a mood and emotion frame to form a feeling frame.  
Approximate linguistic labels provided based on Scherer’s (2001) modal emotions. 
 
Figure 4.8 shows feeling intensity data excerpted from an agent in the Eaters 
domain. As the figure shows, feeling intensity is maximized when the agent first realizes 
that it will achieve its task, and is less when the agent actually achieves the task. This is 
because going into the state where the realization occurs, the agent has a prediction which 
assumes that the task completion is not imminent with some moderate Outcome 
Probability. The realization that task completion is indeed imminent violates this 
expectation. Thus, Outcome Probability was at least moderate, and Discrepancy from 
Expectation was high, leading to a higher intensity (assuming no major changes in the 
other appraisals). Following this, the agent now predicts that the task will be 
 Mood Emotion Feeling 
Suddenness [0,1] .235 0 .235 
Unpredictability [0,1] .400 .250 .419 
Intrinsic-pleasantness [-1,1] -.235 0 -.235 
Goal-relevance [0,1] .222 .750 .750 
Causal-agent (self) [0,1] 0 0 0 
Causal-agent (other) [0,1] 0 0 0 
Causal-agent (nature) [0,1]  .660 1 1 
Causal-motive (intentional) [0,1] 0 0 0 
Causal-motive (chance) [0,1]  .660 1 1 
Causal-motive (negligence) [0,1] 0 0 0 
Outcome-probability [0,1] .516 .750 .759 
Discrepancy [0,1] .326 .250 .362 
Conduciveness [-1,1] -.269  .500 .290 
Control [-1,1] -.141 .500 .402 
Power [-1,1] -.141  .500 .402 
Label  anx-wor ela-joy ela-joy 
Intensity .088  .094 .127 
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accomplished with high probability, so when it is in fact accomplished, Outcome 
Probability is high and Discrepancy is low, causing the intensity to be lower. 
 
Figure 4.8: Feeling intensity is maximized when the agent realizes the task will be completed, as 
opposed to when it actually completes. 
 
4.3 The Influence of Emotion, Mood and Feeling upon 
Behavior 
Feeling adds knowledge to the state representation in a task-independent format 
that combines representations of current (emotion) and past (mood) situations, and thus is 
more general than emotion or mood alone. Feeling can be used to guide control, and thus 
it can influence behavior.  Task-dependent representations can still influence behavior 
both directly (as in how the agent might choose to cope with its feelings in a particular 
domain) and indirectly (in that appraisals can be generated from task-dependent 
representations).  Emotion theories describe a number of influences of emotion, mood, 
and feeling, including effects on cognitive processing (Forgas 1999) and coping (Gross & 
John 2003), and integration with action tendencies (Frijda et al., 1989).  Our current 
approach is very simple, included to demonstrate the possibility of feelings influencing 
behavior and focusing on one aspect of coping: coping by giving up on goals.  
Most AI systems, when faced with a difficult or impossible task, have no way to 

























exhausted.  By providing emotional feedback, our model allows the agent to detect that it 
is not making progress towards the goal, and thus it can choose to discard that goal 
(possibly so it can move on to another goal or stop wasting resources).  This behavior 
could be accomplished without emotions, moods, and feelings, but they provide a natural 
way to achieve this. 
In our model, when the agent fails to make direct progress, it will form a subtask.  
While pursuing a subtask, the agent can choose to give up if its current feeling of 
Conduciveness is negative. Giving up is another form of Tasking—it removes the current 
goal.  As this feeling intensity increases, the agent is exponentially more likely to give up.  
Mood plays a role here by tempering or enhancing the current emotion.  Thus, if things 
are going well (mood is positive) but the agent experiences a momentary setback 
(emotion is negative), the overall feeling intensity will be lower, making giving up less 
likely.  If things have been going poorly, however, the setback will build on that, 
resulting in a more intense negative feeling, making giving up more likely.  The option to 
give up is in competition with other activities in the subtask, specifically attending to 
possible directions in which it can move.  That is, the agent still makes a weighted 
random choice, with giving up being an option whose weight is exponential in the 
magnitude of the negative feeling intensity. As the agent eliminates more of its Attend 
options (by Attending to and then Ignoring them), it becomes more likely to give up 
(since there is less competition from other Attend proposals). 
While the current model only has this single direct influence of feelings on 
behavior, each appraisal of each stimulus has an indirect influence.  As described above, 
at the Attend stage, the pre-attentive appraisals influence where attention is focused next.  
Furthermore, past appraisals influence the current feeling via mood, and thus indirectly 
influence the agent’s decision to give up or not. 
4.4 Summary 
To summarize, the integrated model described in Chapter 3 extends to an 
extended task such as the one described in this chapter with more appraisal dimensions 
involved.  As before, the structures that many of the PEACTIDM steps use and generate 
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are based on appraisals.  In this model, the Perceive and Encode step generates the 
Suddenness, Unpredictability, Intrinsic Pleasantness and Goal Relevance.  Attend uses 
these to choose a stimulus to process further.  Attending also enables the generation of 
other appraisals, including Conduciveness, Causal Agent, Causal Motive, Control, and 
Power.  The Comprehend step is implemented as a verification operator (which generates 
Discrepancy from Expectation) and an ignore operator.  Tasking allows for the 
generation of subtasks when there are no useful actions to take (that is, all other stimuli 
have been Ignored).  Intend takes the action associated with the currently-attended 
encoded structure and creates a prediction of the outcome of that action, as well as the 
Outcome Probability of it.  When pursuing a subtask, the agent has the opportunity to 
give up (another Tasking operator).  This combination of appraisal and PEACTIDM 
leads naturally to sequential constraints on appraisal generation. 
The probability of giving up is influenced directly by the feeling’s Conduciveness 
dimension, and also indirectly by all the other numeric appraisals via the intensity of the 
current feeling.  Feelings are determined by combining mood and emotion, with mood 
being influenced by emotion. 
The model as presented does not use the Unfamiliarity, Urgency, Adjustment, 
Internal Standards, or External Standards appraisal dimensions from Scherer’s theory.  
These were not critical for this domain, and adding these to our architecture is future 
work. 
Finally, we want to note that although the model is implemented in Soar using 
Scherer’s appraisal theory, the underlying theory is intended to be general.  That is, we 
have not intentionally introduced any constraints that would prevent this theory from 
being implemented, for example, in ACT-R using a different appraisal theory (as 
discussed in section 2.1.4.1). 




Evaluation of the Non-Learning Model 
 
What kind of evaluation is appropriate for this model?  Clearly, given the 
computational nature of the system, it is possible to generate quantitative results.  
However, given the lack of human data or existing systems to compare to, these results 
can only be used to support claims about the system itself, as opposed to a comparison. 
First we consider Picard’s (1997) properties that an emotional system should 
have: 
1. Emotional behavior: System has behavior that appears to arise from 
emotions. 
2. Fast primary emotions: System has fast “primary” emotional responses to 
certain inputs. 
3. Cognitively generated emotions: System can generate emotions, by 
reasoning about situations, especially as they concern its goals, standards, 
preferences, and expectations. 
4. Emotional experience: System can have an emotional experience, 
specifically cognitive and physiological awareness and subjective feelings. 
5. Body-mind interactions: System’s emotions interact with other processes 
such as memory, perception, decision making, learning, physiology, etc. 
We begin with 3 (cognitively generated emotions).  The system has this property 
as it uses cognitively generated appraisals as the basis for its emotions. Similarly, the 
system exhibits 2 (fast primary emotions) because the system generates appraisals 
beginning at the Perception and Encoding phases, and those become active at the Attend 
phase.  While some have argued that appraisals are “too cognitive,” and thus can’t be 
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used to generate fast emotional responses (Zajonc, 1984), Soar naturally supports this fast 
appraisal generation, so long as no significant inference is required (Marsella & Gratch, 
in press).  Indeed, one implication of the Scherer (2001) theory is that the relevance 
appraisals (suddenness, unfamiliarity, unpredictability, intrinsic pleasantness, goal 
relevance) are generated very early, and our system reflects that.  Moreover, as soon as 
the appraisal frame becomes active, the appraisals become the emotion.  Then, as further 
processing generates more appraisals, these are added to the emotion.  In the case that 
additional processing is necessary, Soar can learn to speed that processing via its 
chunking mechanism, as discussed in section 3.8. 
In terms of 4 (emotional experience), the system has some emotional experience 
but it is incomplete. The system is cognitively aware of its emotional state (the appraisals 
and the resulting feeling are available in Soar’s working memory).  Also, the feelings are 
subjective in the sense that the agent can, in principle, interpret them however it sees fit.  
While we did not explore this here, there is nothing that prevents cultural knowledge 
from being added that would allow the agent to generate labels for or other interpretations 
of the feeling frame the system generates. However, in the current implementations, it has 
only a trivial physiological system. 
For 5 (mind-body interactions), emotions can influence decision making, in that 
the agent can decide to give up when its emotional state is bad.  We evaluate this 
quantitatively in the context of coherent behavior below.  In Chapter 7, we describe an 
extension of this system that learns as well.  However, we have not yet explored 
connections to memories, perception, physiology, or a host of other areas that could be 
influenced by emotion. 
The remaining criterion, 1, is whether the agent exhibits emotional behavior.  We 
will explore this quantitatively below. 
Picard’s list can be extended with additional requirements.  First, while we have 
described how the model works at the micro level, we have not yet demonstrated that it 
actually produces useful, purposeful behavior.  Does it even finish the task?  If not, does 
its emotional state justify the failure?  Furthermore, there are several implications that 
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should be explored.  For example, if an agent’s feelings are determined by the available 
stimuli, then different environments should lead to different feelings.  Additionally, even 
in environments where the distance to the goal is the same, since Attend takes 
information about the situation (in a task-independent representation) into account (e.g., 
Suddenness), different environments should result in different amounts of time to 
completion.  We also claimed in the last section that feelings should impact behavior, 
both directly and indirectly.  Thus, we suggest that there should be a loop: behavior 
influences feelings, which influence behavior. 
We will show results that suggest the model meets the additional requirements 
described above (summarized here): 
6. The model works and produces useful, purposeful behavior. 
7. Different environments lead to differences in behavior, including: 
a. Different time courses 
b. Different feeling profiles 
8. In a given environment where the agent has choices, these choices impact 
feelings and thus the agent’s success. 
As discussed earlier, for simplicity, we used a non-human agent in the synthetic 
Eaters environment.  Thus, while we present time course data, these data should not be 
mapped onto real time for comparison to humans given the simplicity of the Eaters 
environment, sensors, and effectors. 
5.1 Methodology 
To evaluate the agent, we used several different mazes in the Eaters domain with 
a specific goal location in each.  In each maze, the distance from the start to the goal was 
44 moves (except for the last maze, in which it was impossible to reach the goal).  Our 
aim in designing these mazes was to place the agent in progressively more difficult 
situations to demonstrate the properties listed above.  In the first maze (Figure 5.1), the 
agent did not have to ever retask to reach the goal, and there were no distracting stimuli; 
that is, it could not see any walls on its way to the goal.  The second maze (Figure 5.2) is 
exactly the same as the first except that the path to the goal is lined with walls (and hence 
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distractions).  Thus, even though there are fewer possible moves, there are just as many 
Attend opportunities, and they are actually more interesting (hence, distracting).  The 
third maze (Figure 5.3) is very similar to the second, except that there is a kink in the path 
that requires a brief retasking to maneuver around.  This is because the agent has no 
direct way of making progress when it reaches the kink—if it moves north, it will be 
further from the goal, and it can’t move east because of the wall.  Thus, retasking allows 
it to temporarily move further from its original goal.  The fourth maze (Figure 5.4) 
contains twists and turns such that four subtasks are required to reach the goal.  In the 
fifth maze (Figure 5.5), it is not possible to reach the goal. 
 
Figure 5.1: An Eaters maze without any distractions. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: An Eaters maze with distractions. 
 
 




Figure 5.4: An Eaters maze with distractions and multiple subtasks. 
 
 
Figure 5.5: An Eaters maze that cannot be successfully completed. 
 
5.1.1 Labeling Appraisal Frames 
While the agent does not use linguistic labels to determine its behavior, we found 
such a labeling function is useful in analyzing the agent’s behavior (indeed, we use it in 
the results reported here).  The labeling function is based on the Manhattan distance 
between the agent’s appraisal frame and the modal emotions defined by Scherer (see 
Table 2.2).  Since some modal emotions have many unspecified values (which are treated 
as distance 0), some emotions are frequently closer to the feeling frame than others, even 
when their specified appraisal values are not good matches.  Elation/Joy is one such 
emotion (it has open values for Intrinsic Pleasantness, Discrepancy from Expectation, 
Control and Power).  To compensate for this, we only considered modal emotions that 
have a Conduciveness with the same sign (or an open Conduciveness).  In other words, 
we divided the emotions into positive and negative emotions based on Conduciveness, 
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and ensured that only labels with the same valence as the frame could be applied.  Thus, 
it is not possible for a feeling with negative Conduciveness to be labeled as Elation/Joy. 
An unusual case in the labeling function is the Displeasure-Disgust label: Scherer 
defines it in terms of Intrinsic Pleasantness rather than in terms of Conduciveness (see 
Table 2.2), so we split instances of these into positive and negative, as defined by 
whether Conduciveness was positive or negative.  Thus, positive Displeasure-Disgust is 
when that label most closely matches the current feeling, but Conduciveness is positive.  
This can occur when the agent must do something it dislikes, but is necessary to make 
progress in the task.  Real-life examples might be washing the dishes or cleaning a toilet. 
5.2 Results 
In the first two mazes, the agent will never give up, since it never has to retask.  
However, we anticipate that the distractions from the walls in the second maze will make 
it take significantly longer to complete than the first, and that the agent will experience 
more negative emotions as a result.  In the last three mazes, retasking is required and thus 
the agent can fail.  In the third and fourth mazes, the addition of the subtasks require extra 
processing that could cause the agent to take longer to complete the mazes.  Moreover, in 
the fourth maze, the agent is likely to give up before achieving the goal because of it 
detects it is not making progress.  We expect that the agent will alway give up on the fifth 
maze because it is impossible to solve.  We expect this to take less time than the fourth 
maze, because in the fourth maze the agent is always making progress, whereas in the 
fifth maze, after the first subtask, the agent detects that it is not making progress, which 
should lead the agent to feel worse and hence give up sooner. 
Figure 5.6 shows the time course of behavior in the different mazes, as well as the 
success rate in each maze.  As we predicted, the mazes do lead to different time courses, 
which fulfills property 7a (different time courses).  In general, as the mazes increase in 
difficulty, the agent takes longer to complete (or give up on) them.  When the agent does 
give up, though, it takes less time.  This makes sense since the agent is stopping early.  
Still, the maze with multiple subtasks takes longer than the maze with a single subtask 
when the agent gives up.  The impossible maze takes slightly less (but still statistically 
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significant) time to give up.  This is because, after the first subtask, all subtasks are 
considered “bad” subtasks, whereas in the other mazes all subtasks are “good” subtasks.  
This should mean that there are more negative appraisals in the impossible maze, causing 
the agent to feel worse and thus give up sooner. 
 
Figure 5.6: Number of decision cycles required to complete each maze. 
Success and failure cases shown separately.  The line shows the success rate.  All differences are 
statistically significant (1000 trials for each maze, >95% confidence level). 
 
In Figure 5.7 we see that the data are consistent with this analysis.  The feeling 
labels in the figure are generated as described in section 5.1.1. In each maze’s feeling 
profile, the positive feeling (elation-joy) instances outweigh the negative feeling (anxiety-
worry and displeasure-disgust) instances except for the impossible maze, where the 
negative feelings dominate.  We can also see that each maze produces a different feeling 
profile, and that feeling profiles also differ between the success and failure cases.  This 
supports property 7b (different feeling profiles).  In contrast, the failure cases for mazes 3 
and 4, the positive and negative feelings are nearly equal.  This is to be expected given 
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thinks it is making progress).  Thus, this offsets the negative feelings to some extent.  
However, each negative feeling in a subtask represents an opportunity to give up, and 
these more frequent opportunities lead to failure. 
This, together with the data from Figure 5.6 supports properties 1 (emotional 
behavior) and 8 (choices influence feelings).  That is, success and failure (both absolutely 
and in terms of rate) are defined by different feeling profiles, implying that feelings do 
influence behavior.  Furthermore, even within the same maze the success and failure 
cases have different profiles, implying that the choices the agent makes in those mazes 
impacts feelings and behavior. 
 
Figure 5.7: The average number of decision cycles each kind of feeling was active. 
Labels were produced by our labeling function. The success and failures for mazes 3 and 4 reported 
separately.  “Other” includes Boredom-Indifference, Fear, Positive Displeasure-Disgust, and 
Sadness-Dejection.  Differences between bars within a group (e.g., no distractions, etc.) are 
statistically significant (1000 trials for each maze, >95% confidence level). 
 
Finally, the above analysis supports property 6 (purposeful, useful behavior).  
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environments.  The agent completes the task in many cases, and when it fails, it has a 
negative feeling profile which justifies giving up. 
As a final comment, as shown in Figure 5.7, the agent experiences a wide breadth 
of feeling types in these mazes (seven different kinds according to our labeling function).  
Given the limited nature of the domain, one might expect a much more limited set of 
feelings.  Indeed, we have shown that multiple feelings can arise from simple 
manipulations of the environment, even in similar situations.  One way is via interactions 
with the goal—adding structure that requires subtasks leads to many different feelings 
emerging.  Another way is via interactions between mood (including decay) and emotion.  
Sometimes, even though we might classify a mood one way and an emotion another way, 
their combination results in yet another classification.  This prediction could help explain 
why people are sometimes confused about their feelings. 
5.3 An Intermediate Summary 
Before moving on to our explorations into learning, we would like to summarize 
what we have learned so far.  We have presented a novel integration of cognition and 
emotion based on the functional fit between appraisal theory and an abstract theory of 
cognitive control (PEACTIDM):  cognition (as PEACTIDM) provides the processes 
necessary to generate emotions, whereas emotion  (via appraisals) provides the data 
which cognition (via PEACTIDM) functionally demands.  To evaluate the feasibility of 
this theory, we extended the Soar cognitive architecture to include the computational 
mechanisms necessary to support our proposed integration. We explored this system 
within the context of a simple stimulus response task and an ongoing task.  Our 
evaluation centered on qualitative and quantitative issues regarding whether the system 
actually works and has features consistent with a complete emotion system.  For the most 
part, it succeeds, although we discussed several avenues for future expansion. 
We summarize the key theoretical features of our proposal as follows:  
1. Appraisals are a functionally required part of cognitive processing; they cannot be 
replaced by some other emotion generation theory. 
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2. Appraisals provide a task-independent language for control knowledge, although 
their values can be determined by task-dependent knowledge.  Emotion and mood, 
by virtue of being derived from appraisals, abstract summaries of the current and 
past states, respectively.  Feeling, then, augments the current state representation 
with knowledge that combines the emotion and mood representations and can 
influence control. 
3. The integration of appraisal and PEACTIDM implies a partial ordering of 
appraisal generation. 
4. This partial ordering specifies a time course of appraisal generation, which leads 
to time courses for emotion, mood and feeling.   
5. Emotion intensity is largely determined by expectations and consequences for the 
agent; thus, even seemingly mundane tasks can be emotional under the right 
circumstances. 
6. In general, appraisals may require an arbitrary amount of inference to be 
generated.  That is, the theory supports Marsella & Gratch’s (in press) distinction 
between appraisal and inference. 
This system lays the groundwork for extensive additional research.  We present 
some of that research starting in Chapter 7, namely on intrinsically motivated 
reinforcement learning, and describe other areas in the future work at the end (Chapter 







Like the Soar system we described in this paper, there are several implemented 
computational systems that use appraisal theory in some form and realize a functional 
agent that can behave in some environment, and in fact systems such as Gratch and 
Marsella’s (2004) EMA (EMotion and Adaptation) inspired the current work.  The 
primary goal of these systems is generating believable behavior, and there is less of an 
emphasis on the underlying theoretical integration of emotion and cognition, beyond the 
assertion that cognition is required to generate appraisals.  In addition to different goals, 
these systems differ from the Soar system in two theoretically important ways.  First, 
most existing systems generate appraisals and emotions all at once and then only rely on 
the emotion outcome.  That is, while the emotion has an impact on the system, the 
appraisals do not.   This property can be appreciated by observing that the emotion 
generation could occur via a non-appraisal process, and the system would not know the 
difference.  In contrast, appraisal generation is required as part of the Soar agent’s normal 
processing—they cannot be replaced by some other emotion-generation process. 
Second, a consequence of appraisals being generated as part of the Soar agent’s 
normal processing is that there is a time course to the generated appraisals and resulting 
emotions so that the during processing of a single stimulus, the agent’s emotions can 
change as new information becomes available.  Many existing systems do not support 
this because the appraisals are generated all at once. 
In the remainder of this section we will briefly describe various systems with 
respect to these two distinguishing issues, as well as several other dimensions, including 
system type (architecture or modular), which appraisal theory is used, how many 
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emotions the system can have and whether they are categorical or continuous, and 
whether it has mood and feeling. Table 6.1 summarizes the comparison. 
EMA is a computational model of a simple appraisal theory implemented in Soar 
7 (an older version of Soar).  EMA uses its own appraisal theory based on common 
dimensions from several existing theories.  Like our model, appraisals are generated 
incrementally, but attention does not gate the generation of later appraisals.  Rather, EMA 
generates multiple appraisal frames at once, and an attention mechanism focuses on a 
single frame, which determines the emotion.  One or more categorical labels are then 
assigned to the single emotion instance; we interpret this as more specific emotion labels, 
as opposed to multiple emotions.  EMA also has mood, which is an aggregate of all 
current appraisal frames; in contrast, mood in our system is an aggregate over previous 
emotions (including the current emotion).  Finally, the appraisals are required by EMA’s 
coping mechanism, but not directly by other mechanisms (e.g., the attention mechanism 
uses emotion intensity, but not the appraisals). 
MAMID (Hudlicka, 2004) is a system aimed at building emotions into a cognitive 
architecture.  MAMID’s architectural mechanisms are higher level than Soar’s, making it 
more a modular system by comparison.  For example, it has a Situation Assessment 
module and an Action Selection module, as opposed building these out of more primitive 
components.  Like EMA, the appraisals used are common to many theories.  Unlike our 
system, MAMID generates an intensity for each of several categorical emotions.  While 
this is modulated by the previous emotion, there is no separate mood concept.  Appraisals 
in MAMID are generated “all at once,” in the sense that the Affect Appraiser module 
takes in information about the current situation and outputs an emotional state.  Thus, 
appraisal is not necessarily required by the system, and could be replaced by some other 
method for generating emotion. 
Ortony, Clore and Collins (1988) describe a theory (commonly called the OCC 
model) that was not originally intended for use in systems that have emotion, but has 
since been implemented for that purpose.  We will discuss OCC in the context of Neal 
Reilly’s (1996) Em system.  As a theory, OCC does not specify the architecture of the 
underlying system, but Em is implemented as a modular system.  OCC uses a small set of 
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appraisals inspired by existing theories to generate an emotion hierarchy.  In Em, 
multiple categorical emotions can exist simultaneously.  OCC only briefly touches on 
mood, but leaves it unspecified.  In Em, mood is an aggregation of current emotions, 
similar to how EMA uses an aggregate of current appraisal frames.  Like MAMID, Em 
uses an Emotion Generation module that takes a situation description and outputs an 
emotion—the fact that it uses OCC (and hence appraisal) internally is not critical to its 
functioning.  Like MAMID, then, appraisals are not generated incrementally. 
Kismet (Breazeal, 2003) is a social robot.  It is a modular system, but as a 
functioning robot, it handles real perception and motor.  It also has physiological drives.  
While it has “appraisals,” these are arousal, valence, and stance, which are better 
described as a circumplex model (Yik et al, 1999).  Kismet can be in a single categorical 
emotion state at a time, and there is no mood (although the current emotion can indirectly 
influence the next emotion).  Appraisal is not incremental, in the sense that all appraisal 
dimensions always have a value.  Additionally, the appraisal information is only used to 
generate the emotions, and thus is not actually required by the system. 
System Appraisal 
Theory 






EMA Mixture Categorical Single Mood only Yes Coping only 
MAMID Mixture Categorical Multiple No No No 
OCC/Em Mixture Categorical Multiple Mood only No No 
Kismet Circumplex Categorical Single No No No 
Our system Scherer Continuous Single Yes Yes Yes 




The Learning Model and an Initial Evaluation 
 
The previous discussion begs the question: what functionality do emotions 
provide?  As we alluded in Chapter 1,emotions may enhance aspects of the cognitive 
architecture’s functioning.  For example, memory retrieval may be enhanced by the use 
of emotion cues, or various parameters may be influenced by emotion.  Perception and 
comprehension of a situation may be influenced by emotion.  Physiologically, emotion 
may help prepare the body for action; e.g., fear might elevate heart rate and breathing, in 
case the agent needs to run away.  Emotions are also widely recognized as important 
aspects of communication, via facial expression, tone of voice, and posture.  Emotion 
may also play a role in learning. 
In this thesis, our focus in on learning, although we do touch on parameter 
adjustment in Chapter 9.  Our existing mood module could be considered a very abstract 
physiological model, but currently, detailed modeling of physiology is not supported by 
Soar (although we won’t rule out the possibility for the future).  We also have not 
explored emotion in social contexts yet, and thus have no model of emotional 
communication. 
In this chapter, we present work in which reinforcement learning is driven by 
emotion. Intuitively, feelings serve as a reward signal that motivates the agent to learn to 
perform better (that is, to improve the feelings it experiences). The agent learns to behave 
in a way that makes it feel good while avoiding feeling bad. Coupled with a task that the 
agent wants to complete, the agent learns that completing the task makes it feel good. 
This work contributes not only to research on emotion in providing a functional 
computational grounding for feelings, but it also contributes to research in reinforcement 
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learning by providing a possible detailed theory of the origin and basis of intrinsically-
motivated reward. 
7.1 Intrinsically Motivated Reinforcement Learning 
In traditional reinforcement learning, an agent perceives states in an environment 
and takes actions. A critic, located in the environment, provides a rewards and 
punishments in response to the choices being made (Figure 7.1a). The agent learns to 
maximize the reward signal (Sutton & Barto, 1998). This model is highly abstract and 
assumes a source of reward that is specific to every task. 
In intrinsically motivated reinforcement learning, the environment is split into 
internal and external parts. The organism is composed of the internal environment 
together with the agent (Singh et al., 2004). The critic resides in the internal environment, 
and thus the organism generates its own rewards. 
In our system, the appraisal process is the critic, and the resulting valenced feeling 
intensity provides the reward signal over which the agent learns (Figure 7.1b). 
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                              (a)                                                                                           (b) 
Figure 7.1: Comparison of standard and intrinsically motivated reinforcement learning systems. 
(a) A traditional reinforcement learning system.  The critic is part of the environment.  (b) Our 
system viewed as an intrinsically motivated reinforcement learner.  The critic is realized as the 
appraisal process, and is part of the organism.  (Adapted from Singh et al., 2004.) 
 
7.2 Related Work 
As alluded above, Singh et al. (2004) implemented an intrinsically motivated 
reinforcement learning system.  In their model, the agent generates intrinsic reward for 
unexpected events; this drives the agent to learn skills.  That is, there is a set of actions 
the agent can take, and when they are combined together in the right sequences, the 
environment changes.  For example, the agent can flip a switch, which may cause a light 
to turn on.  In a more complex case, the agent can perform a complex series of actions 
(including things like turning on music, kicking a ball, and lower level eye and hand 
movements) that ultimately result in a toy monkey crying out.  When these changes are 
new to the agent, it receives reward for causing them.  As they become more familiar, 
reward diminishes.  Thus, the agent is intrinsically motivated to learn skills.  The system 
also incorporates extrinsic reward.  The idea is that the agent can learn skills via intrinsic 
reward, and then utilize them in the pursuit of extrinsic rewards.  For example, the agent 
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might get an extrinsic reward when the monkey cries out, but get intrinsic reward for all 
of the intermediate skills it must learn to do so (e.g., kicking the ball). 
While this work demonstrates how intrinsically generated reward can lead to 
learning, it is very abstract and thus does not address any of the issues concerning 
integration with cognition or cognitive architecture.  We could interpret the agent as 
generating an unexpectedness appraisal, but clearly this work is not in the context of a 
complete appraisal theory. 
There have been other attempts to integrate emotion-like processes with 
reinforcement learning. Hogewoning et al. (2007) and Hogewoning (2007) describe a 
system developed in Soar that adjusts its exploration rate based on short- and long-term 
reward trajectories. They consider the reward histories to be a kind of affect 
representation. This work is differs from our own in that it emphasizes adjusting 
exploration rate, it is not based appraisal theories, and rewards are not intrinsically 
generated. 
Salichs & Malfaz (2006) describe a system with the three emotions: happiness, 
sadness and fear. Happiness and sadness serve as positive and negative rewards, while 
fear affects the selection of “dangerous” actions. Happiness is generated when an external 
stimulus is present that is related to current internal drives (e.g., if hungry and food is 
present, the agent will be happy). Sadness is when the desired external stimulus is not 
present. Fear is when the state values have a large variance (even if positive overall). This 
work is interesting in that it connects physiology to goals and thus emotion. However, its 
range of emotions is limited, and there is no underlying theory that unifies the emotions 
(they are each determined separately), nor is there a principled integration with cognition. 
7.3 Reinforcement Learning in Soar 
As noted above, we generated a reward signal using the agent’s current feeling.  
To take advantage of this reward signal, we used Soar’s reinforcement learning 
mechanism (Nason & Laird 2005).  This mechanism works by learning expected values 
for future reward to aid in the selection of operators. This knowledge is represented in 
Soar via numeric preference values associated with operator proposals.  These numeric 
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values are created by rules called RL rules that match a proposed operator in a given 
context (as determined by the conditions of the rules).  A given RL rule may be very 
specific or very abstract, and thus may match in many or few contexts.  Thus, there is no 
single state representation; rather, the state is determined by the features tested by all of 
the conditions of the RL rules that match at any given time.  When multiple operators are 
proposed in a given situation, the agent will select the one with the highest value (in an 
epsilon greedy fashion (Sutton & Barto 1998)).  For example, if operator A is proposed 
with a numeric preference of 0.3, and operator B is proposed with a numeric value of 0.8, 
operator B will be selected unless an exploratory move is made, in which case the 
selection occurs uniformly randomly.  The agent can receive a reward in the (which 
occurs when a rule places a numeric value in a special place in Short-Term Memory).  In 
the Decision Phase, if there is a reward available, the values of the RL rules involved in 
the selection of the current operator are adjusted using a variant of the SARSA algorithm 
adapted for Soar (Nason & Laird 2005).  This, in turn can change behavior as the RL 
rules associated with operators that lead to the most reward will tend towards higher 
values than other RL rules. 
7.4 Reinforcement Learning in the Model 
The reward signal was generated as follows: the magnitude was determined by the 
intensity of the feeling, and the sign was determined by the valence of the Conduciveness 
appraisal.  Thus, the reward signal falls into the [-1,1] range. 
In order to allow the agent to learn, we added several RL rules associated with 
various decision points.  Thus, instead of making random decisions about, say, which 
direction to move in given a set of Encoded structures, the agent instead learns which 
actions to take as it gains experience, e.g., those that lead it closer to the goal..  Thus, the 
agent learns which stimuli to Attend to, whether it should ignore an Attended stimulus or 
Intend taking an action, when to create subtasks, and when to retrieve supertasks. 
Because of this, the potential for inferior performance exists: for example, the agent can 
ignore a stimulus that is on the path to the goal, or it can Intend moving into a wall. The 
agent will have to learn not to do these things.  Table 7.1 summarizes what the agent can 
and cannot learn. 
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Perceive/Encode No learning; for a given situation, the same structures are generated. 
Attend vs. Tasking The agent learns to choose among four or five stimuli to attend to and 
two subtasks to create (or one to retrieve).  Thus, it must choose from 
between five to seven possible operators in this step. 
Verify vs. Ignore The agent learns when to process the stimulus further.  However, once 
chosen, both routes have a fixed outcome (i.e., the agent does not learn 
“how” to do them). 
Intend No learning.  Once the agent has Attended and verified a stimulus, the 
action is determined (move in the direction associated with the 
stimulus). 
Table 7.1: Summary of what the agent can and cannot learn. 
 
The features tested by the RL rules associated with each of the operators are 
summarized in Table 7.2.  As we can see, it’s actually fairly complicated; we discuss how 
we simplified this in the next chapter. 
Feature Operator 
Passable Attend, Tasking, Ignore, Intend 
Path Attend, Tasking, Ignore, Intend 
Good/bad Subtask Attend, Tasking, Ignore, Intend 
X,Y location Tasking 
Features across multiple stimuli Tasking 
Subtask type Give up 
Table 7.2: Summary of features tested by RL rules associated with various operators. 
Tasking includes both Create Subtask and Retrieve Supertask. 
 
The reader will notice that the features here are not the agent’s current feelings.  
We did explore using the feeling frame values as features, but it did not work (results not 
shown).  The issue is that most appraisals are continuous in nature; thus, in order to have 
RL rules that match in multiple situations, the features would need to be value ranges.  
Unfortunately, even with a small number of bins, this still lead to a large number of RL 
rules, each of which only matched in a small number of situations, which meant learning 
was slow.  Additionally, from a theoretical standpoint, there’s no reason to believe that 
the current values of the agent’s feelings will tell it much about what it should do next, 
since it includes historical information which can skew the description away from the 
current situation.  Thus, while the feelings were used to generate rewards, they were not 
used as the state features.  The reader might wonder about using the emotion frame as 
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state features; however, as the emotion frame is derived directly from the above features, 
this would have been equivalent to using those features, which is what we did. 
We also extended the description of a subtask to include a route to the subtask 
location. For example, if the subtask is to reach x=4, the description would specify 
whether that would be accomplished by moving north or south. This is to allow the agent 
to learn distinct values for each of these routes, since they may not both lead to the goal.  
The task is shown in Figure 7.2 with the optimal subtask locations marked. 
 
Figure 7.2: The maze used for the learning tests. 
The paths of the optimal subtask locations are shown. 
 
Additionally, minor changes were made to the exact values of several of the 
appraisals. These values are still qualitatively the same as we reported earlier but were 
tweaked to improve learning. For example, sometimes the agent would get stuck in 
cycles where it could get infinite reward; adjusting the values slightly was sufficient to 
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overcome this problem in this simple domain.  We will return to the cycle problem again 
in Chapter 9 where we provide a better solution.  We also disabled the agent’s ability to 
give up. This allowed us to assess the ability of the agent to learn without interference 
from this additional effect. We could have explored learning when to give up, but decided 
not to in order to simplify the learning problem the agent faces. 
While the problem may look very simple (there are no branches in the maze), 
from a reinforcement learning perspective, learning to solve these problems has its 
challenges. First, the problem is partially observable. The RL rules associated with most 
operator proposals do not include the x,y location of the agent (the create-subtask 
operator proposal is an exception
4
).  Second, the agent always has four stimuli to contend 
with (five when the goal completion internal stimulus is present); this is exacerbated by 
the inability to determine what state it is in.  Additionally, it has to contend with whether 
it should be Tasking or not, and how.  Third, the problem is non-Markovian; that is, the 
available sensory information at each step is not guaranteed to be sufficient to uniquely 
determine the best action and additional historical information may be required.  For 
example, the agent doesn’t know what direction it just came from, and thus can’t easily 
avoid backtracking.  Mood provides some historical information, but also contributes to 
the non-Markovian nature of the problem.  This is because mood influences the current 
feeling, which determines reward, and mood is influenced by previous states.  Finally, the 
agent doesn’t know the effects of its actions (e.g., it doesn’t know that moving into a wall 
will get it nowhere).  These factors make this task quite challenging. 
Still, this task is far from impossible.  Recall that each Encoded structure contains 
information about whether the associated direction is on the path towards the goal or not 
(section 4.1.1).  Because this is generated by dynamic difference reduction, a wall might 
be marked as “on path” because, if the agent could move there, it would indeed be closer 
to the goal.  Thus, the agent essentially has to learn to follow the stimuli that are on path, 
unless the only on path stimuli is not passable, in which case it needs to learn to create 
the proper subtask to get around the blockage (i.e., moving north vs. moving south).  
                                                 
4
 Providing the x,y coordinates for create-subtask operator proposals reduces the partial 
observability; this was simply to make the problem easier. 
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Still, if it simply moves past a point where it should be creating a subtask (see Figure 
7.2), then moving backwards will actually be marked as on path and passable, and thus 
lead to short-term reward, even though it does not actually get the agent closer to the 
goal.  Once a stimulus is Attended, it must learn whether to ignore it or not.  Generally, 
the agent will eventually learn to Attend to the right stimulus, and thus needs to learn to 
not ignore it, but the agent may learn to ignore a “bad” stimulus that is Attended because 
of an exploratory move. 
7.5 Methodology 
Three agent types were tested: a standard reinforcement learning agent, which 
only received reward at the end when it accomplished the task, an agent that had no mood 
(so its feelings were its emotions) and a full agent that included mood. 
We expect the standard reinforcement learning agent to have difficulty since it 
does not have access to the sensor that tells it how far it is from the goal. This may seem 
like an unfair comparison; however, creating a standard reinforcement learning agent 
with this capability but without the other appraisal information is difficult, since the 
appraisal representations comprise part of the state representation. If we were to remove 
the appraisal information, then the standard reinforcement learning agent would really be 
solving a different problem.  If we leave the appraisal information, the agent is not really 
standard. However, the agent without mood can be viewed as a very rough approximation 
of an agent that would take advantage of this information to generate more frequent 
rewards. This approximation includes appraisal information, but without mood it is not 
the complete emotion system.  Thus, we have two extremes and an intermediate agent: an 
agent with no emotion information at all, an agent with emotion but no mood, and an 
agent with both emotion and mood. 
The agents learned across 15 episodes. This was repeated in 50 trials. We 
recorded the amount of time it took each agent to complete the task (measured in Soar 
decision cycles). Because of the task difficulty, the agents would sometimes get 
hopelessly lost; thus, to limit processing time, episodes were cut off at 10000 decision 
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cycles. We report the median to avoid skewing the data. 
 
Figure 7.3: Learning results for three different agents. 
 
7.6 Results 
The results are shown in Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4. The horizontal axis is the 
episode number, while the vertical axis is the median amount of time it took the agent to 
complete the task.  
First consider Figure 7.3. The standard reinforcement learning agent never made 
any significant progress. This is expected because 15 training episodes do not provide the 
agent with enough experience when it only gets a single reward for each episode.  In 
reinforcement learning, the reward “backs up” only one state per episode, and there are 
many more than 15 states on the path to the solution in this domain
5
.  
                                                 
5
 Calculating the exact number of states is difficult due to the nature of RL in Soar.  However, we 
estimate there to be more than 500 states. 
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The agent whose feeling is just its emotion (without mood) does not appear to be 
learning at first, but the values eventually converge. The agent whose feelings are 
composed of both emotion and mood does much better earlier on, learning much faster. 
Figure 7.4 shows a close-up of the last several episodes for the two agents with 
emotions. The “error” bars show the first and third quartiles, which gives an indication of 
the amount of variability in the agents’ behavior at that point. As we can see, the median 
for both agents reach optimality at the same time, but the variability of the agent with 
mood is much lower. In fact, the variability of the moodless agent reaches all the way to 
10000 even in the final episode, implying that fewer agents did well on the task. In 
contrast, by the final episode, the agent with mood has small variance. 
 
Figure 7.4: Close-up of last several episodes for agent with just emotion and agent with emotion and 
mood. 
“Error” bars show first and third quartiles. 
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7.7 Discussion 
The first thing to note is that the agents with emotion learn very fast relative to the 
standard reinforcement learning agent. This is because they get frequent reward signals 
(on every decision cycle) and thus get intermediate feedback on how they are doing. The 
standard reinforcement learning agent only gets reward feedback at the end, and thus it 
takes a long time for that information to propagate back to earlier actions.  This result is 
not unexpected since part of the agent’s feeling is related to whether it is getting closer to 
the goal or not (albeit with the caveats mentioned earlier, it was not clear that the agent 
would be able to learn at all). 
Next, the agent with mood learns faster. The reason is because, sometimes when 
the agent is doing some internal bookkeeping kinds of processing, it is not experiencing 
an emotion. Thus, the agent without mood will get zero reward for those states, and later 
reward has to propagate back through those states. Propagation takes time (this is why the 
standard reinforcement learning agent takes so long to learn). 
The agent with mood, however, carries a summary of its recent emotions forward 
into those states (with some decay). Thus, these states get reasonable value estimates, 
which speeds up the propagation immensely. 
The reader may be concerned that all we have shown is that intermediate rewards 
speed learning, regardless of their origin.  We agree that meaningful intermediate rewards 
should always speed learning; what we have presented is a theory about the origin of 
those rewards and how they are applied to an integrated system centered on abstract 
functional operations, and a demonstration that the rewards generated by that theory do, 




Revising the Model: Extending to a Continuous 
Domain; Improving Simplicity and Correctness 
 
8.1 Open Questions 
Based on our experience with the previously described model, many questions 
arose, including: 
 Will our model work in a more complex domain? That is, will it scale to a 
continuous time, continuous space domain? 
 Which aspects of the model are responsible for its performance?  That is, 
which appraisals really make a difference in learning? 
 Is the model more complicated than it needs to be? That is, can some aspects 
of the agent be unified or eliminated to produce a simpler model that allows us 
to more directly answer the previous question? 
In order to address these questions, we created a new domain and streamlined the 
model.  Also, rather than use the full model for the task, we chose a subset of appraisals 
to develop and analyze more fully.  In this chapter, we will describe the new domain and 
the revised model. 
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8.2 A New Environment and Task 
 
Figure 8.1: The room environment. 
The agent is the green triangle; starting configuration for this map shown.  The numbers show the 
ids of the rooms and blocks (the ids of gateways are not shown).  This map has seven rooms the agent 
can see (the lower-left room is required to make the map rectangular, but is not part of the agent’s 
environment), six gateways, and two blocks.  The storage room is id 13 (upper-right). 
 
The new environment is called the Room environment (Figure 8.1).  It is a 2D 
world, with rectangular rooms connected by doors (1-dimensional gateways).  Rooms 
may contain zero or more blocks.  The environment is discrete in the sense that walls, 
blocks, etc. are located on an underlying grid (for example, a block takes up one grid 
space), but continuous in that the agent can move in a continuous fashion (that is, unlike 
Eaters, the agent does not move from grid location to grid location discretely).  Each 
object (room, gateway, or block) has a unique id, which the agent can perceive.  The 
agent can also perceive the locations of the objects in terms of their angle and distance 
relative to itself.  Areas and gateways are always visible to the agent, while blocks can 
only be seen if they are in the agent’s vision cone.  Time in this domain is discretized at 
the decision cycle level (so time moves forward one step for each decision cycle in Soar, 
regardless of whether the agent is doing anything).  The actions the agent can take 
include turning and moving forward (at fixed rates each time step), picking up a block (if 
in an adjacent grid space) and putting down a block (in the grid space in front of the 
agent).  The agent can move forward and turn at the same time, and can only carry one 
block at a time. 
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The task we created for the agent in this environment is called the clean house 
task.  The world represents a house with some blocks scattered throughout.  One of the 
rooms is designated the storage room.  The agent’s task is to clean all the rooms.  This 
involves moving any blocks it finds to the storage room.  Even if a room has no blocks, 
the agent must still visit it in order to know that.  Furthermore, the agent does not know 
the layout of the house, so it must find out how many rooms and blocks there are.  Thus, 
although the agent knows the id of the storage room at the beginning, it must still find 
that room. 
Does this environment and task fulfill our needs?  The room environment is 
certainly more complex than the Eaters environment, including continuous time 
(essentially) and space, and more actions.  The task is also more complex, involving 
moving objects around as opposed to just moving the agent around.  Thus, this should 
give us ample opportunity to see if the model scales. 
In terms of allowing us to test the influence of various appraisals, the domain 
should provide enough features to develop models for several appraisals, but not all (for 
example, as a single-agent task, there is not much opportunity to explore causality).  Still, 
it is sufficient for exploring the premise of the thesis; namely, to see if this kind of a 
system can work at all (or, having accomplished that, to explore why it works).  Finally, 
this domain certainly doesn’t impede us from trying to simplify the model. 
8.3 Revising the Model 
There were multiple issues with the previous model that we addressed via various 
revisions: 
 The model requires different domain-specific knowledge (8.3.1) (e.g., how to 
encode the stimuli for this domain and what the subtasks are).  This wasn’t an 
issue with the previous model; it was just a basic requirement.  The model was 
also extended to include the ability for the agent to create a task-specific map 
of the environment; this was necessary primarily because, without knowledge 
of where the blocks are and what rooms are clean, the agent would have no 
way to know when it had completed the task. 
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 The previous model had issues with prediction that resulted from the way 
Tasking interacted with Intend. This was addressed by unifying Tasking with 
Encoding and Intending (8.3.2).  
 Previously, the theory determined the valence of the reward based solely on 
the Conduciveness dimension.  As we looked more closely at other appraisals, 
it seems that more than just Conduciveness should contribute to valence.  This 
led us to change not only the calculation of valence, but also the calculation of 
the resulting reward (8.3.3). 
 There were some changes prompted by the continuous nature of the 
environment (8.3.4).  Specifically, we adjusted the time appraisals continue to 
influence emotion, mood and feeling, and how reward should back up 
between temporally distant states. 
 Some aspects of the model complicated learning and obscured the core issues 
(i.e., ignoring stimuli and giving up), or introduced arbitrary constraints (i.e., 
inability to Attend to the same stimulus twice).  These aspects were removed 
to simplify the model (8.3.5). 
 There was an error in the way feeling intensity was calculated that was 
corrected (8.3.5). 
We will address each of these in turn. 
8.3.1 Domain-specific knowledge 
There are three kinds of external stimuli, one for each of the objects in the world: 
rooms, gateways, and blocks.  As in Eaters, there are also internally generated stimuli for 
completed tasks.  The agent has one top-level (super) task, which is to clean the house, 
and two subtasks: clean the current room, and go to another area.  In this domain, each 
task type has a unique completion stimulus associated with it. 
The agent creates an Encoded structure for each stimulus containing information 
used to drive behavior directly and to support the creation of appraisals.  A summary of 
the Encoded information is shown in Table 8.1; details are discussed below. 
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Common Id, Type, Passable, Path, Distance-to-goal, Progress 
Room (Common) 
Gateway To-room-id, Range, Angle 
Block Range, Angle 
Task-completed (Common) 
Table 8.1: Encoded features for various stimuli. 
 
For direct behavior, each stimulus contains information directly from perception 
such as its type and id; these are used by the agent to determine what kinds of actions can 
be taken in response to a stimulus, and to distinguish stimuli of the same type. Gateways 
and blocks also contain the angle the agent must turn to face it and the range (distance) to 
the object, which is used to determine how to physically move to it.  Gateways include 
the id of the room to which they connect, which is necessary for the agent to determine if 
parts of the world are not yet explored.. 
For appraisal generation, the Encoded information is further augmented with 
internal information including whether the stimulus is “on the path” to the current task, 
the distance to the goal, and whether the agent is making progress.  The path and progress 
augmentations help determine the agent’s Goal Relevance and Conduciveness appraisal 
values.  This is described in the next chapter. 
Each stimulus is labeled as “on the path” or “off the path”.  For example, if the 
agent is already carrying a block, then attending to another block would be considered off 
the path.  On the other hand, if the agent’s current task is to go to some room, and there is 
a gateway that leads to that room, the corresponding stimulus would be on the path.  Task 
completion stimuli are always on the path.  Path information comprises a lot of 
knowledge that helps guide the agent; we will revisit this later. 
Distance to the goal (not to be confused with range to objects) is calculated in the 
following way.  For the clean house task, the distance is the number of rooms not yet 
cleaned, plus one if there are any unvisited rooms (since there may be entirely unknown 
rooms in that case).  For the clean room task, the distance is the number of known blocks 
currently in the room, plus one if the room needs to be checked (recall that the agent can 
only see blocks in its vision cone, so there may be blocks it is unaware of in the room).  
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For the go to room task, the distance is the number of rooms the agent must traverse to 
get to the destination room from its current location. 
The purpose of computing distances is to support the generation of the progress 
augmentation.  An agent is making progress if the distance to the goal is less on the next 
attend operator.  In the case where the task has just changed (because the agent created a 
subtask or retrieved the supertask), progress is determined by whether the agent was 
making progress previously (that is, when no previous distance is available to compare 
to, we assume the agent is doing as well as it was). 
With respect to intentions, each stimulus can only be responded to in a single 
way, based on context.  This is to focus the learning problem as discussed in the next 
chapter.  Thus, if attending to a gateway, the agent will move through that gateway.  If 
attending to a block, the agent will move to the block and pick it up (unless it is already 
carrying a block, in which case it will just move to the block and do nothing).  If 
attending to a room other than the storage room, the agent will spin in place.  This allows 
it to see all the blocks in the room (or confirm that there are no blocks in the room).  If 
attending to the storage room, the agent will put down the block it is carrying.  If it is not 
carrying a block, then it will just spin. 
We don’t consider this limitation particularly restrictive.  In the Eaters model, the 
agent already had the choice to give up or ignore instead of Intending; adding additional 
possible actions would be similar. 
Finally, the model was extended by giving the agent the ability to create a task-
specific map.  The agent creates a map of the world as it moves about; thus, it knows 
which rooms are connected to which, whether they have been visited, and if it has seen 
any blocks in them. 
This map is built using operators that are not related to appraisals.  In the 
PEACTIDM framework they could be considered Comprehend operators, but their use 
was primarily pragmatic, and not a serious attempt to model how people would do this.  
The information in this map is used to determine when the clean house task is finished 
(all rooms in the map are marked as clean).  It is also used to calculate the distance for the 
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go to room subtask.  Finally, it is used to calculate some of the path information (e.g., if 
not carrying a block and the clean house task is active, then creating a subtask to go to a 
room that contains a block is on the path). 
8.3.2 The Unification of Tasking with Encoding and Intending 
In the previous model, Tasking was handled by different operators than 
Attending.  That is, the agent could choose to Attend to a stimulus or to engage in 
Tasking.  This resulted in some additional complexity: if the agent chose to Attend, then 
it would follow a Comprehend-Intend path and deal with verifying predictions, whereas 
if it chose to Task (e.g., create a subtask), then it has to use a different set of operators 
that did not involve Comprehension (including verifying predictions) or Intending. 
This caused problems with predictions.  First, the agent’s predictions were 
generated in the context of the current (sub)task, which meant that if the agent switched 
tasks, the prediction was invalidated.  This would lead to many cases where there was no 
prediction.  Furthermore, this made the prediction aspects of the system fragile 
(predictions had to be dealt with properly in all possible edge cases where they might be 
invalidated, and the system had to know what to do when there was no prediction).  The 
root of the issue is that Tasking is essentially an internal action, but it doesn’t generate or 
process predictions in the same way that external (Intended) actions do. 
Furthermore, this separation made the learning problem more complex (at least 
conceptually), because the agent had to separately learn not only what to Attend to, but 
whether it should be Tasking instead.  Maintaining this distinction was challenging and 
unnecessary.   
 In the revised model, Tasking opportunities (i.e., creating new subtasks or 
retrieving the supertask) are all Encoded as internal stimuli (Figure 8.2), similar to how 
task completion stimuli are Encoded internally.  As with all stimuli, the agent always 
makes predictions about what stimulus will be perceived next; thus, the agent can predict 
that it will perform Tasking next, or what stimulus it will Attend to following a Tasking 
operation.  The Tasking operation itself is performed in the Intend step.  Thus, the agent’s 
cycle is always “Attend-Comprehend-Intend.”  Does this imply a major change to 
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PEACTIDM?  Not really; it is essentially a matter of perspective and semantics.  We 
could either say we have changed PEACTIDM by integrating Tasking with Encode, 
Attend, and Intend, but we could just as easily say that, from the PEACTIDM 
perspective, these are completely separate processes, and the fact that they share 
operators is an implementation detail.  Still, it is an important implementation detail that 
has simplified the code, but also unifies the theory in an interesting way.  Thus, we prefer 
to think of it as a theoretical modification. 
 
Figure 8.2: Example of stimuli the agent must choose among for Attention. 
This example is when the agent has just started (and thus only knows about rooms immediately 
adjacent to the starting room).  As the agent learns about more rooms, it will have stimuli to create 
subtasks to go to those rooms, too. 
8.3.3 Valence and the Calculation of Reward 
 In the Eaters model, the magnitude of the reward was the feeling intensity, and its 
valence was the valence of the conduciveness dimension.  The problem with this 
approach is that more dimensions than just conduciveness appear to contain valence 
information.  In particular, those dimensions whose values can be negative imply a 
valence.  For example, intrinsic pleasantness can have a value that implies intrinsically 
unpleasant, which should impact the valence. 
To accommodate this, the valence needed to be represented as a continuous value 
instead of just a sign.  That way, different appraisals with valences can interact to 
produce an overall valence.  This is accomplished merely by averaging the valences 
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together.  Averaging means the final valence value will be in the [-1, 1] range, just like 
the individual appraisals that contribute to it. 
But how do valence and intensity interact, then, to produce a reward?  For 
inspiration, we turn to circumplex models of emotion (see Yik et al., 1999 for a review).  
In circumplex models of emotion, there are commonly two dimensions used to describe 
an emotion: intensity (variously called arousal, activation, engagement, etc.) and valence 
(also called pleasantness).  Various combinations of these dimensions are associated with 
various emotions (Figure 8.3).  Our interpretation of circumplex theory is that, unlike 
appraisals, which describe emotion antecedents, these dimensions describe what an 
emotion looks like when it is manifest. 
With regards to reward, we consider some cases.  Suppose intensity is very high 
(near 1), but valence is very low (near 0).  In this case, the reward should be a medium 
value, since the stimulus is simultaneously important (intense) but unclear (not strongly 
valenced).  The agent, thus, should not be influenced too strongly by this outcome.  
Consider the case where the intensity is very high but the valence is exactly zero.  This 
time, the reward should be zero because the stimulus is not punishing or rewarding—it is 
merely exciting (in a completely neutral way).  A simple way of combining intensity and 
valence to produce these results is simply to multiply them.  Thus, the reward still falls in 
the [-1, 1] range. 
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Figure 8.3: Typical circumplex model. 
Adapted from Feldman Barrett & Russell (1998). 
 
8.3.4 Adapting to a Continuous environment 
The change to a continuous environment raised some issues related to the effects 
of time.  First is the issue of the duration of an emotion.  Previously, an emotion lasted 
the entire time the corresponding appraisal frame was active.  In the discrete domain of 
Eaters, this meant a few decision cycles before the agent was ready to attend to another 
stimulus.  In the continuous time and space of the room environment, the agent is 
attending to a stimulus for the entire time it takes to execute the resulting intention.  For 
example, if the agent is attending to a gateway on the other side of the room, the appraisal 
frame for that stimulus will be active as the agent moves across the room, which may be 
over 100 decision cycles.  This can cause major skewing of the reward: actions that take 
longer will be rewarded or punished more.  Mood will be similarly skewed.  To prevent 
this, an appraisal frame is deactivated as soon as the intention begins (in Soar terms, 
when the Intend operator is selected).  Thus, the appraisal frame is only active for two 
decision cycles: Attend and Comprehend.  It is during this time that the agent may 





















Second, there is the issue of how reward should backup to previous states that are 
separated by time.  In the discrete case, every decision cycle corresponded to a 
reinforcement learning state, even if it was a fixed decision (that is, every operator had an 
associated RL rule).  This resulted in many RL rules whose only purpose was to allow 
values to backup from later operators.  Furthermore, the exact descriptions of these states 
could influence how values backed up through them.  To circumvent this issue entirely, 
Soar’s reinforcement learning mechanism was given the ability to “jump gaps” between 
RL states.  Thus, two RL states can be separated by as many decision cycles (that is, 
time) as necessary and reward will backup from one to the other (discounted by the 
number of decision cycles in between).  For example, suppose the agent Attends to a 
gateway across the room.  The next stimulus it Attends to might be the new area it ends 
up in.  With gap jumping, the agent will not need an RL rule for every decision cycle in 
between (e.g., while it walks across the room). 
8.3.5 Simplifications 
The agent’s ability to ignore stimuli was removed.  This was so we could better 
focus the learning problem (see Chapter 9 for more details).  This has behavioral 
implications as well—if the agent Attends to a stimulus, it commits to performing the 
corresponding action, which may be lengthy (e.g., walking across the room).  Without the 
ability to ignore, the agent is stuck doing this action (even if it was chosen as an 
exploratory move).  This is actually not out of line with how ignore was originally 
intended to be used; in the non-learning Eaters, it allowed the agent to avoid acting on 
impassable stimuli (i.e., walls).  There are no such stimuli in the Room domain, so 
leaving out ignore does not represent a major change in capability. 
8.3.6 Corrections 
Another change has to do with how feeling intensity is calculated.  Previously, 
dimensions whose values are in the [-1,1] range were “normalized” by dividing by 2.  
Ostensibly, this was to put them in the same range as those dimensions whose values are 
in the [0,1] range.  Upon reflection, however, we decided this was a mistake.  In the 
intensity calculation, we take the absolute values of these larger ranges, which already 
forces them into the [0,1] range.  By dividing by 2, we essentially forced them into the 
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[0,0.5] range, which meant that they had less influence than the unnormalized 
dimensions.  This “normalization” was removed. 
8.4 Summary 
The model was revised to work in a new continuous domain.  Tasking was unified 
with Encoding and Intend.  The way reward is generated was modified to allow for 
multiple sources of valence.  Minor simplifications and corrections were made. 
In the next chapter, we will explore the effects of various combinations of a 
subset of appraisals on learning in an attempt to determine how aspects of the system 
actually contribute to its performance.  We will also explore how feelings can influence 




Learning Experiments and Evaluation in the 
Continuous Domain 
9.1 What is the Agent Learning? 
In the model, there are at least two kinds of things the agent can learn about: 
which stimulus to Attend to, and what to Intend in response to the chosen stimulus.  (In 
principle, there are other things the agent could be learning, such as how to Encode 
stimuli, how decompose the task into subtasks, RL state representations, etc., but these 
things are not handled by our current theory or model.)  In the revised model, we chose to 
focus on the Attention problem; thus, every stimulus in a given context has only one 
response (as described earlier).  Given that Tasking options are now represented as 
stimuli, learning what to Attend to includes learning when and what to Task. 
In Soar terms, this means there are only RL rules associated with the Attend 
operator.  Those rules represent the state using the following features: 
 task type (clean-house, clean-room, goto-room) 
 task object (id of the storage room, room to clean, or room to go to) 
 whether the task has been completed or not 
 the unique id associated with the stimulus (e.g., the id of a block) 
 path (on or off) 
 progress (true or false) 
 whether agent is carrying a block or not 
 passable (always true in this task) 
 99 
This representation is a further expansion of the representation used in Eaters.  
While features like passable, path, progress and current task
6
 have been retained, new 
domain-specific features have also been added, such as whether the agent is carrying a 
block.  Features such as the task object and the unique id of the stimulus are intended to 
be fairly domain-general, but may not be appropriate for some domains. 
9.2 Choosing Appraisals to Explore 
One of the goals of the revised model is to allow us to identify how various 
appraisals influence the agent’s learning via their impact on the reward signal, and 
possibly the Q-values directly.  In general, many of the appraisals in the previous model 
had very simple (even constant) calculations for their values.  Thus, they probably 
exerted little influence on the outcome.  Developing a theory for computing each 
appraisal could be the topics of several theses, and the value of trivial implementations is 
questionable.  Thus, we opted not to include many of the appraisals.  Furthermore, given 
our focus on learning what to Attend to (including Tasking), but not on how to Intend, 
some appraisals are more appropriate for this exploration than others.  We explored a 
subset of the dimensions from the previous model: Conduciveness, Outcome Probability, 
Discrepancy from Expectation, Goal Relevance, and Intrinsic Pleasantness.  We will 
discuss here which appraisals we included or not and why, and then discuss the appraisals 
we explored in more depth in the next sections. 
First consider the Relevance appraisals (see Table 2.2).  These appraisals are 
supposed to help the agent determine what to Attend to; unfortunately, most of them are 
too low-level in nature to be suitable for serious modeling in Soar.  Suddenness is 
perceptually based; given that our implementation of the environment and task does not 
include a strong model of perception, we opted to leave it out.  Similarly, taking 
Unpredictability seriously seems to require tracking low-level statistical data, for which 
the current model in Soar is not well suited.  Goal Relevance, on the other hand, is a 
higher-level construct that we could easily model (see section 9.7).  Our model also made 
it easy to explore Intrinsic Pleasantness (see section 9.8). 
                                                 
6
 In Eaters, progress and task were combined into a single good/bad subtask feature.  These are 
now represented separately. 
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The next grouping in Table 2.2 is the implication appraisals.  According to 
Scherer’s theory, many of these dimensions, like Causal Agent, Causal Motive, Control 
and Power, are more directly relevant to choosing a response (Intending) than to choosing 
what to Attend to.  Furthermore, for the room environment and clean house task, there is 
only one agent, making causality less interesting.  Thus, these dimensions were also left 
out.  However, the Conduciveness dimension is directly relevant to the model’s learning 
(see section 9.5).  Additionally, since the model already generates predictions, including 
Outcome Probability and Discrepancy from Expectation was natural (see section 9.6). 
Other dimensions in Scherer’s theory not mentioned above (Unfamiliarity, 
Urgency, Adjustment, and Internal and External Standards) were not included in the 
original model.  Again, given that each one could be a thesis by itself, we chose not to 
engage in trivial explorations of them. 
In the sections ahead, we will describe the models of the appraisals we chose.  
While these models are an improvement over the earlier models, they are still fairly 
simple.  The goal here is to show that non-trivial models of these appraisals can 
contribute to learning in a complex domain.  As stated above, a “complete” model of any 
particular dimension is well beyond the scope of this (and probably any single) thesis. 
9.3 Methodology and Results Interpretation 
The results below are of the agent solving the task in the environment shown in 
Figure 8.1 (storage room in the upper-right; see section 8.2 for details).  Except where 
noted, the experiments were conducted with the following parameters: 50 trials of 15 
episodes each.  Learning rate and exploration rate held constant at 0.3 and 0.1, 
respectively; the exploration method is epsilon greedy.  Because the agent can get stuck 
in cycles, episodes were cutoff after 10000 decision cycles.  To avoid these outliers from 
skewing the data, medians are reported instead of means.  Finally, to give an idea of the 
variability in the results, the first and third quartiles are also reported in the charts of 
decision cycles, total reward, and fraction correct predictions. 
In interpreting the results, it should be noted that the first quartile of, say, the 
decision cycles chart does not necessarily correspond to the first quartile of the total 
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rewards chart.  In fact, it is often the case that the third quartile of the decision cycles 
corresponds to the first quartile of the total rewards, because longer task times typically 
correspond to less reward.  The only way to be sure (indeed, the only way in which it 
matters) is when a quartile has an unusual shape.  In these cases, the unusual shape is 
often visible in the different charts, making it easy to see what corresponds to what. 
Another result we report is failures.  The failure data show the number of times 
the agent had to be cutoff (reached the decision cycle limit), which is usually indicative 
of a cycle (sometimes, but not necessarily, an infinite reward cycle) or just failure to 
learn.  The failure figures show the total number of failures across all trials for each 
episode.  These data can show trends in the way the agent fails as it learns.  The failure 
tables show three kinds of failure counts.  Total Failures is the number of episodes across 
all trials that were cutoff (total number of episodes is 50*15 = 750 for most experiments).  
Trial Failures is the number of trials that had at least one failed episode.  Final Episode 
Failures is the number of trials whose final episode was a failure.  We consider this 
number to be the most informative.  If it is lower than the Trial Failures, it implies that 
the agent was able to recover from other failures (and if the cutoff was higher, that the 
other failure numbers would come down).  If both Final Episode Failures and Trial 
Failures were high, then it would imply that the agent was learning cyclical behavior, or 
failing to learn at all.  If both numbers are low, then it implies that the agent is learning 
well all the time.  The failure figures and tables give complementary views of the failure 
data. 
9.4 Overview of Results 
In this section, we provide an overview of the results to help the reader. 
1. Conduciveness (9.5): The agent learns to do well, but has a several failures. 
2. Outcome Probability and Discrepancy from Expectation (9.6): The agent learns 
just as well, and failures are reduced to zero. 
3. Goal Relevance (9.7): The agent’s knowledge about important stimuli dominates 
performance, leading to very little learning (the agent does well right away).  A 
reduced-knowledge version shows that the goal relevance improves performance, 
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but the other appraisals are still necessary for learning in knowledge-poor 
situations. 
4. Intrinsic Pleasantness (9.8): This appraisal had a mixed influence on performance, 
which is expected for an appraisal that is independent of the goal. 
5. Other results (9.9): Mood (9.9.1) had no effect.  We also tried dynamically 
changing the exploration rate (9.9.2) and learning rate (9.9.3) parameters of the 
RL system based on the agent’s feelings.  That is, the feelings were used to 
regulate other parts of the cognitive architecture.  This had a generally positive 
impact (faster convergence), but also resulted in slightly more failures. 
A more detailed summary of the results is given at the end of the chapter. 
9.5 Exploring Conduciveness 
Perhaps the single most important appraisal, conduciveness, is the agent’s most 
direct measure of how good or bad the current situation is for it.  To review, the 
appraisals influence the feeling intensity and valence (indeed, if Conduciveness is the 
only appraisal, it determines them), which in turn determines reward.  Thus, this appraisal 
alone is sufficient to generate a reward signal, and thus we expect the agent to learn to 
accomplish the task. That is, using this appraisal alone will tell us if the task is structured 
properly (with respect to how it is encoded, etc.) so that it is learnable at all.  However, 
we expect other appraisals to help refine the reward signal or otherwise influence the 
agent’s behavior in ways that result in improved learning (e.g., faster, or fewer errors, 
etc.). 
9.5.1 Calculating Conduciveness 
The calculation of Conduciveness was greatly simplified from the original model 
in order to make it easier to see how the system works (and to remove any mystery about 
what is really responsible for the results).  In the revised model, Conduciveness is based 
only on the path (on/off) and progress (true/false) aspects of the encoded stimuli as 
shown in Table 9.1. 
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 Path: On Path Off 
Progress: True 1.0 -0.5 
Progress: False -0.5 -1.0 
Table 9.1: Conduciveness values. 
 
The values for “on path and progress true” and “off path and progress false” are 
self explanatory: it is good for the agent to be doing well and bad for it not to be doing 
well.  The other values were chosen to be negative to avoid infinite reward cycles.  An 
infinite reward cycle is a sequence of actions that leads to infinite reward, such that the 
agent learns to do that cycle instead of the task.  Traditional RL domains do not have this 
problem because the agent only gets rewarded upon completion of the task (and rewards 
elsewhere are zero or negative).  In a system where the agent generates its own rewards 
all the time, we must be very careful to structure the task such that the agent cannot get 
infinite reward by repeating the same set of actions over and over.  For example, a 
common cycle that this value structure eliminates is creating a subtask that is on path, and 
then retrieving the supertask (which is off path), and then creating the on path subtask 
again, etc.  If an on path stimulus were rewarding independent of progress, this could lead 
to an infinite reward cycle.  Clearly, there are many possible value structures that would 
work, but we found this one to be adequate (it is still not perfect, but reward cycles are 
rare, so the agent does not usually find them). 
9.5.2 Conduciveness Results 
The experimental setup for this experiment is exactly as described above. 
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Figure 9.1: Decision cycles to task completion for Conduciveness experiment. 
The agent learns to complete the task in fewer decision cycles across several episodes.  Median, first, 
and third quartiles shown. 
 
 
Figure 9.2: Total reward accumulated during task for Conduciveness experiment. 




















































Figure 9.3: Failures across trials for each episode for Conduciveness experiment. 
Failures generally increase until the end where there is a reduction. 
 
Final Episode Failures Trial Failures Total Failures 
3 12 57 
Table 9.2: Failures for Conduciveness experiment. 
The agent fails many times, but usually recovers. 
 
Figure 9.1 shows that the agent learns to complete the task more quickly over 
several episodes.  The dotted line shows the approximately optimal number of decision 
cycles.  The line is approximate because determining the actual optimal is very difficult 
since it is not the lowest possible number of decision cycles, but rather corresponds to the 
highest possible reward, which is difficult to determine analytically.  Figure 9.2 shows 
that the total reward also increases across those episodes.  Again, the approximate 
optimal is shown.  The implication is that the agent is in fact learning to do the task 
better.  Figure 9.3 shows that the total number of failures across trials is low early on 
(before much learning takes place), but gets worse in the middle and then better at the 
end  This implies that the agent is learning cyclical behavior, but generally recovering.  
Table 9.2 shows that the agent did experience several Total Failures across 12 of the 50 
trials (24%), but only 3 trials actually ended in failure, which corroborates the conclusion 



















probably do better (in terms of failures) if the cutoff were raised; however, this would not 
affect the results for the number of decision cycles and total reward, so we did not run 
additional experiments. 
We conclude from these results that the Conduciveness appraisal is sufficient for 
learning, although there is certainly room for improvement. 
9.6 Exploring Outcome Probability and Discrepancy from 
Expectation 
As described before, making predictions is a central aspect of the model.  In 
Scherer’s theory, predictions are associated with an Outcome Probability appraisal, and 
their success or failure is captured via the Discrepancy from Expectation appraisal.  Thus, 
the inclusion of these makes sense for our model.  The inclusion should give us insights 
into how these appraisals influence learning. 
We expect these appraisals to influence feeling intensity (and thus reward, since it 
is calculated from feeling intensity).  As discussed earlier, an outcome that is expected 
should result in less intense emotions than one that is unexpected.  This principle is 
integrated into our feeling intensity equation via the Outcome Probability and 
Discrepancy from Expectation appraisals, making them crucial to our theory.  
Furthermore, since feeling intensity is an input to the calculation of reward, these 
dimensions will influence the reward the agent gets, and hence its learning. 
Generating values for these requires generating predictions.  In the previous 
model, prediction generation was very simple: the agent always predicted that the next 
stimulus would be passable and on the path, except when it was about to accomplish the 
task, in which case it predicted that the next stimulus would be the task completion 
stimulus. 
In an effort to make more realistic predictions, we introduced a new memory.  
This memory records every stimulus that the agent experiences and links representing 
which stimuli have ever occurred in sequence, making it conceptually similar to Nuxoll’s 
(2007) episodic memory, but our memory is more tailored to our needs.  Specifically, it 
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also includes “strength” values for each link, which is intended to represent how 
frequently and recently a particular sequence occurred.  The frequency and recency 
information tells the agent how commonly this link is used.  The idea is that, as it gains 
experience, the agent will settle into following the same sequence of actions (namely, 
those that maximize reward), thus experience the same sequence of stimuli.  This will 
cause the strengths of the links between those stimuli to increase (and the strengths of 
other links to decrease).  The agent can then use this information to make predictions 
about what it thinks will happen next (e.g., the strongest link connects to the stimulus that 
has occurred next most commonly).  The use of strength perhaps makes it more similar to 
Kaplan & Kaplan’s (1982) notion of contiguity in cognitive maps (i.e., stimuli that occur 
close together in time tend to become associated).  We will simply refer to this memory 
as the episodic memory (not to be confused with Nuxoll’s episodic memory). 
The strengths of the links in the episodic memory have values in the [0,1] range 
and are updated as follows.  When a stimulus is attended to, the strength of the link 
between the previously attended stimulus and the next stimulus is increased by a constant 
(we used 0.2 because it allowed the agent to potentially maximize the strength in a fairly 
small number of experiences, but not so small that it would thrash).  If this is a new link, 
then it is given an initial value of that constant.  To preserve contiguity, other links that 
are not used must be decreased in strength (otherwise, everything could eventually be 
associated with everything).  Thus, all other links emanating from the previous stimulus 
are decreased in strength by another constant (we used 0.05, which is smaller than our 
increase constant, to reflect that the decrease is probably being “split” among many links, 
as per Kaplan et al. (1991).  A better model might actually calculate the decrease based 
on the number of links, but we started with a simple model that proved sufficient for our 
purposes).  Strength values are capped at 0 and 1.  Thus, if the agent learns to do some 
particular sequence, then that link will eventually have strength 1 while all other links 
from the previous stimulus will have strength 0.  Finally, each recorded stimulus has a 
total strength value, which is the sum of the strengths of the links emanating from it.  
This value is used to generate a pseudo probability as described below. 
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The stimuli that are recorded in the episodic memory are exactly those stimuli that 
the agent encodes, but augmented with a context value.  The purpose of the context is to 
disambiguate some stimuli so the agent can learn the sequences properly.  For example, 
the current stimulus might be gateway-17, but unless the agent records which side of 
gateway-17 it is on, the next stimulus in the sequence will be pulled between the stimuli 
for each of the rooms.  The context value is actually a combination of the current room, 
the current task type, and the current task object id.  By including this information, most 
sequences can be disambiguated, which essentially reduces the noise in the system, 
giving us to get a clearer picture of what the agent is able to learn. 
This episodic memory is used to generate values for the Outcome Probability and 
Discrepancy from Expectation appraisals in the following way.  When the agent Intends 
something, it creates a prediction with an associated Outcome Probability.  The 
prediction is the stimulus at the end of the strongest link, and the Outcome Probability is 
the strength of that link divided by the previous stimulus’s total strength.  If there are no 
links (because the previous stimulus is new), then the agent makes a default “passable, on 
path” prediction like the original model, with an Outcome Probability of 0.5.  
Discrepancy from Expectation is calculated as 0 if the currently Attended stimulus 
matches the prediction, and 0.5 if not (as determined by Comprehend). 
While this model of the Outcome Probability and Discrepancy from Expectation 
appraisals is an improvement over the original model’s methods, there are issues.  First, 
the value calculated for Outcome Probability is not actually a probability.  Rather, it is 
pseudo probability in the sense that, the larger it is, the more likely the event is to occur.  
This follows directly from the way in which the strengths are computed.  Certainly, at 
extreme values, the agent must have a history of almost always or almost never following 
that link, and thus the value most likely does represent a probability in those cases.  
Again, the value reflects frequency and recency, so even if, historically, the agent has 
followed link A more, if recently it has repeatedly followed link B, then the stimulus 
corresponding to link B will be given a high Outcome Probability. 
Second, one could argue that predictions should be based on actions instead of 
stimuli (i.e., predicting the outcome of actions taken in some state).  However, since 
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actions are tied to stimuli in this model, this is really the same thing.  Furthermore, the 
agent is not predicting the outcome of an action/stimulus, but rather what it will be 
Attending to next.  These are related in that the situation the agent ends up in as a result 
of the action it takes contains many possible stimuli the agent can Attend to, one of which 
should be the predicted stimulus.  But the agent may still choose to Attend to some other 
stimulus instead.  In other words, the agent is not predicting the situation it will end up in, 
but which stimulus it will Attend to in that situation.  Finally, one could argue that when 
there is a mismatch between the prediction and reality, the value of Discrepancy from 
Expectation should reflect the extent of the mismatch.  For example, the prediction is 
partially correct (e.g., it correctly predicted a gateway, but the wrong one), the 
Discrepancy value should be lower than if the prediction is completely off.  We agree that 
this is worth exploring in the future, but felt our simpler model was a sufficient starting 
point for our exploration.  Thus, there is plenty of room for improvement in this model, 
but our results should be indicative of the usefulness of these appraisals. 
Finally, we expect the way in which these appraisals are generated to have some 
side effects: reward will tend towards zero as the agent accumulates experience, which 
should help eliminate the infinite reward cycles described earlier.  As the agent learns, it 
will settle into a fixed sequence.  Repeating this sequence enough will result in the 
strengths of the associated links going to 1, while all other strengths go to 0.  Thus, these 
stimuli will be predicted with an Outcome Probability of 1.   Since the agent is following 
this sequence, it will predict the associated stimuli and thus Discrepancy from 
Expectation will be 0.  With these values, the calculated intensity will be 0, and thus the 
reward will be 0.  Thus, we expect total accumulated reward to go up in earlier episodes, 
but down in later episodes.  In other words, the reward becomes non-stationary.  In the 
case of an infinite reward cycle, this may eventually break the cycle as the values of the 
Attend operators are reduced towards 0 (but if the alternative values are negative, a cycle 
may still exist).  In practice, such cycles are very rare, so the agent doesn’t usually find 
them. 
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9.6.1 Outcome Probability and Discrepancy from Expectation Results 
The experimental conditions are exactly as reported earlier.  The Conduciveness 
appraisal is still enabled, as are the Outcome Probability and Discrepancy from 
Expectation appraisals. 
 
Figure 9.4: Decision cycles to task completion for Outcome Probability and Discrepancy from 
Expectation experiment. 
The agent learns to complete the task in fewer decision cycles across several episodes.  Median, first, 






























Figure 9.5: Total reward accumulated during task for Outcome Probability and Discrepancy from 
Expectation experiment. 
The agent learns to accumulate more total reward across several episodes, but reward decreases 




Figure 9.6: Fraction of predictions made that are correct for Outcome Probability and Discrepancy 
from Expectation experiment. 


























































Final Episode Failures Trial Failures Total Failures 
0 0 0 
Table 9.3: Failures for Outcome Probability and Discrepancy from Expectation experiment. 
The agent never fails. 
 
Figure 9.4 shows that the agent learns to complete the task in fewer decision 
cycles over several episodes.  Figure 9.5 shows that the agent also learns to increase its 
total reward, but with a slight decrease towards the end.  This matches our qualitative 
prediction that reward would go down.  The approximate optimal reward is not shown 
here since reward is non-stationary and thus does not tend towards some maximum.  This 
will be true for the remainder of the reward results in this chapter.  The agent’s ability to 
correctly predict outcomes also improved across episodes, as shown in Figure 9.6.  Thus, 
the episodic memory and the appraisals seem to be functioning as intended. 
Comparing to the agent with Conduciveness only, the number of decision cycles 
did not change (compare Figure 9.1 and Figure 9.4).  However, the number of failures 
went to 0 across all categories (Table 9.3), implying that cycles were broken, or that the 
agent learned good behavior more quickly.  (Note that good behavior does not necessarily 
correspond to fewer decision cycles).  Finally, we note that the scale of the rewards is 
reduced compared to the Conduciveness only condition (Figure 9.2).  Again, this is 
expected because the intensity’s “surprise factor” will often be less than 1 (and never 
more than 1), forcing the intensity (and thus reward) to have a smaller magnitude in 
general. 
We conclude from these results that adding the Outcome Probability and 
Discrepancy from Expectation appraisals to the system results in learning improvements 
via the ability to make better predictions and to generate more accurate values for these 
appraisals with respect to those predictions. 
9.7 Exploring Goal Relevance 
The purpose of Goal Relevance is to help the agent choose what to Attend to.  
Specifically, if something is not Goal Relevant, the agent shouldn’t waste any resources 
on it.  By including this, we hope to learn how a proactive influence on what stimulus to 
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Attend to interacts with reinforcement learning (which learns after an action has been 
selected). 
In the revised model, Goal Relevance is entirely based on the stimulus’s path 
on/off augmentation, as shown in Table 9.4.  In other words, Goal Relevance is the 
continuous numeric translation of the binary values for path.  (Clearly, in a more complex 
model, it may be more that that). 
Path On Path Off 
1.0 0.0 
Table 9.4: Goal Relevance values. 
 
There are multiple ways in which Goal Relevance could influence what the agent 
attends to.  The most obvious is simply to include allow it to influence feeling intensity, 
as before.  Thus, more relevant stimuli will result in more intense feelings (and thus more 
extreme rewards).  One problem with this approach is that, if there are many other 
appraisals, the effect of Goal Relevance will be washed out (since, unlike Outcome 
Probability and Discrepancy from Expectation, it is just averaged in with the others).  On 
the other hand, if there are very few other appraisals, Goal Relevance can skew the values 
too strongly.  Indeed, in experiments not shown, allowing Goal Relevance to influence 
feeling intensity resulted in the creation of infinite reward cycles.  The problem was that, 
for positive rewards, Conduciveness and Goal Relevance were both 1 (because the 
stimulus was on path), so the magnitude of positive rewards was unchanged.  But for 
negative rewards in the case where the stimulus was on path but progress was false, 
Conduciveness would be -0.5 while Goal Relevance was still 1.  The effect was to 
essentially decrease the magnitude of negative rewards in enough cases that the agent 
was able to nearly always find an infinite reward cycle.  We could possibly have avoided 
this by manipulating the exact values of the appraisals, or the underlying values from 
which they are generated, but this was undesirable since it meant exploring a large 
parameter space, and probably finding a domain-specific set of values. 
An alternative solution is to recognize that, by giving a stimulus a particular path 
value, the agent is indicating that it already knows if a stimulus is relevant or not.  Thus, 
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rather than just learning after the fact that a stimulus should or should not have been 
Attended to, the agent can influence the selection directly. 
We call this direct influence value boosting, which works like this.  Each Attend 
operator has some value as learned by the agent via reinforcement learning.  The agent 
“boosts” this value by adding the value of the Goal Relevance appraisal to it.  Thus, for 
stimuli on the path, the agent adds 1 to the value, and for stimuli off the path, the value is 
unchanged (0 is added).  Since the rewards the agent gets are no greater than 1, most of 
the values are less than 1, and thus adding 1 is a major boost.  Essentially, the agent 
ignores stimuli that are off the path. 
This does not mean that the agent is automatically perfect.  In any given situation, 
there may be many stimuli that are on the path.  For example, if the agent is in the 
supertask and not carrying a block, all subtasks to go to rooms that have not yet been 
visited, or that are known to contain blocks, are on the path.  The agent must still learn 
which order to do these in.  Furthermore, because the value of these operators is 
artificially inflated, the learned values will often be negative (to reduce the summed value 
closer to the actual value).  Given enough time, the value of an operator can actually be 
reduced to the point that other operators can have higher values. 
9.7.1 Goal Relevance Results 
The experimental conditions are exactly as reported earlier.  The Conduciveness 
Outcome Probability and Discrepancy from Expectation appraisals are still enabled.  The 
Goal Relevance appraisal does not influence the feeling intensity or reward directly, but 




Figure 9.7: Decision cycles to task completion for Goal Relevance experiment. 





Figure 9.8: Total reward accumulated during task for Goal Relevance experiment. 
Reward decreases across episodes, with an intermediate pronounced dip corresponding to the 















































Figure 9.9: Failures across trials for each episode for Goal Relevance experiment.   
There is a pronounced peak corresponding to the pronounced variations in the other data. 
 
 
Figure 9.10: Fraction of predictions made that are correct for Goal Relevance experiment. 
The agent’s predictions are fairly flat, ending slightly worse than how it began. 
 
 
Final Episode Failures Trial Failures Total Failures 
0 12 26 
Table 9.5: Failures for Goal Relevance experiment. 





















































Except for a small amount of early learning and a blip in the middle, the number 
of decision cycles to task completion is flat (Figure 9.7).  This is to be expected, given 
that the agent knows the path value for every stimulus; all it must learn is a good order in 
which to Attend to the on path stimuli (which accounts for the early learning).  The blip 
occurs because, as described earlier, the boosting has artificially inflated the values of 
some operators, causing the learned values to become very negative.  In some cases, 
these values will become negative enough that they outweigh the boost, which may 
suddenly cause some other stimuli (which are probably off path and untried) to become 
higher-valued.  The agent will then Attend to these stimuli until it discovers that they are 
even worse, at which point it returns to the on path stimuli. 
The reward starts high and goes low (Figure 9.8).  Again, this is expected, as the 
agent is choosing stimuli that are on path, and thus highly rewarding, since the agent has 
not experienced them much yet.  As it repeats these choices, however, the surprise factor 
of the intensity calculation decreases, leading to decreased reward.  There is also blip 
corresponding to the one in the decision cycles. 
Similar to the decision cycles, the fraction of correct predictions is fairly flat 
(Figure 9.10).  There is a slight initial decrease resulting from the fact that, early on, the 
episodic memory contains no information, so the agent is always making the default 
prediction (passable and on path).  Since this prediction is very vague, and the agent is 
choosing nearly all on path stimuli (except for exploratory moves), the predictions are 
correct the vast majority of the time.  As the episodic memory grows, the agent makes 
more specific predictions, and thus is wrong more often. 
The failure data (Figure 9.9 and Table 9.5) show a peak in failures around episode 
10, corresponding to blips in the decision cycle and reward data.  This is consistent with 
the explanations for those above. 
9.7.2 Knowledge Revision 
We found these results somewhat uncompelling.  On the one hand, value boosting 
works.  However, due to the exhaustive knowledge the agent has regarding path 
information, it looks like it accounts for nearly all of the agent’s performance, which 
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raises questions of the usefulness of the other appraisals.  Does this mean that the other 
appraisals are unnecessary?  The answer is no.  First, there is some learning going on, 
even if only a little.  Furthermore, Goal Relevance alone cannot be used to generate 
rewards in this model since it does not have a valence.  Thus, Conduciveness, at least, is 
necessary.  Additionally, the number of failures is higher than it is when Goal Relevance 
is not included, yet the agent still always finishes the task.  This implies that there is 
indeed learning going on that allows the agent to recover, and as we saw, Outcome 
Probability and Discrepancy from Expectation have positive effects on failure reduction.   
Still, the results would be more compelling if the learning was more obvious.  
Given the complexity of the task, the agent needs a lot of this kind of domain-specific 
knowledge or else it fails to learn (experiments not shown).  However, we may be able to 
reduce the agent’s knowledge some, and thus provide greater opportunity for learning, 
thus better demonstrating how the appraisals can all work together.  That is, we want to 
show that, even in the absence of exhaustive knowledge, this appraisal still has a positive 
influence on the agent’s learning. 
Performing an exhaustive set of experiments to determine the minimum amount 
of acceptable knowledge would have been prohibitively expensive.  Instead, we pulled 
out a few key pieces of knowledge and made the path value for those situations 
“unknown”.  This had the side effect of requiring us to introduce an “unknown” value for 
progress as well.  This is because, when the agent first creates a subtask (and thus has no 
reference point to compare progress in that subtask), it inherits the path value of the 
subtask stimulus itself (so if the task was on path, then the first step is considered to be 
making progress, etc.).  Thus, if the path value for the task is unknown, then the progress 
for the first step in a subtask will also be unknown.  Thus, we expanded the definitions of 
Goal Conduciveness and Goal Relevance to account for these new values.  For 
Conduciveness, only the clearly good situation is given a positive value; the others are 
negative to discourage cycles (Table 9.6).  For Goal Relevance, unknown is given an 
intermediate value (Table 9.7). 
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 Path: On Path: Unknown Path Off 
Progress: True 1.0 -0.25 -0.5 
Progress: Unknown -0.25 -0.25 -0.75 
Progress: False -0.5 -0.75 -1.0 
Table 9.6: Conduciveness values (accounting for unknown path and progress). 
The values for the old cases are unchanged. 
 
Path On Path Unknown Path Off 
1.0 0.5 0.0 
Table 9.7: Goal Relevance values (accounting for unknown path). 
The old values for the old cases are unchanged. 
 
One piece of knowledge removed concerned the go to room subtask.  When the 
agent is in room A and wants to get to room B, and these rooms are adjacent, then the 
stimulus corresponding to the gateway connecting the rooms is considered on path, and 
all other gateways are off path.  This knowledge was left in.  The knowledge that was 
removed covered the situation when the rooms were not adjacent.  For that case, 
previously the agent would look in the task-specific map that it had created and find 
which adjacent rooms were closer to the destination than the current room.  Gateways 
leading to those rooms were marked as on path.  Now, if the agent is more than one room 
away from the destination, the path values for the gateways are all unknown, and it must 
learn the best route to the destination. 
The other piece of knowledge concerned when to attend to rooms when in the 
clean house supertask.  The agent usually wants to create subtasks when in the supertask, 
and always wants to ignore gateways and blocks (if the agent wants to go somewhere or 
clean something, it should create the appropriate subtask).  This knowledge was left in.  
With regards to attending to rooms while in the supertask, however, the situation is more 
complex.  Usually the agent wants to ignore rooms just as it wants to ignore gateways 
and blocks.  The exception is when the agent is carrying a block and is in the storage 
room.  In that case, Attending to the room results in the agent putting down the block.  
The knowledge about when room stimuli in the supertask are on or off the path was 
removed and made unknown. 
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9.7.3 Reduced Knowledge Results 
For the reduced knowledge version, we ran for 30 episodes instead of 15, and set 
the cutoff at 20000 decision cycles instead of 10000.  This is to help the agent cope with 
the increased difficulty of the task. 
 
Figure 9.11: Decision cycles to task completion for reduced knowledge Goal Relevance experiment. 





























Figure 9.12: Total reward accumulated during task for reduced knowledge Goal Relevance 
experiment. 
Reward roughly tracks the shape of the decision cycles. 
 
 
Figure 9.13: Fraction of predictions made that are correct for reduced knowledge Goal Relevance 
experiment. 

























































Figure 9.14: Failures across trials for each episode for reduced knowledge Goal Relevance 
experiment.   
Failures are erratic after initial learning, but reduced towards end. 
 
Final Episode Failures Trial Failures Total Failures 
2 29 58 
Table 9.8: Failures for reduced knowledge Goal Relevance experiment. 
The agent fails many times, but usually recovers. 
 
The reduced knowledge results show that the agent must still learn; Goal 
Relevance does not eliminate the usefulness of the other appraisals.  There are at least 
two kinds of learning that are happening: early and late.  The early learning takes place in 
the first 3-5 episodes (see all figures above), and is much more pronounced than in the 
agent with full knowledge.  It is here that the agent is learning what to do with the 
“unknown” stimuli.  After that, the agent experiences regression in learning (most 
pronounced in Figure 9.11 and Figure 9.14; note the correspondence between the third 
quartile in Figure 9.11, the first quartile in Figure 9.12, and the peaks in Figure 9.14), just 
as it did in the full knowledge case (Figure 9.7).  In this case, the regression is worse, 
probably because some of the stimuli the agent gets exposed to are “unknown”.  Thus, 
whereas before the agent only had to deal with “off path” stimuli, it now must also deal 



















We conclude that Goal Relevance has a generally positive impact on performance 
by reducing the number of contenders for Attention that the agent must learn to 
distinguish among.  With exhaustive knowledge, the agent is able to do this very well, but 
even with reduced knowledge the agent generally does better than without this appraisal.  
This implies that, in addition to Goal Relevance, the other Relevance appraisals 
(Suddenness, etc.) are also worth future exploration. 
9.8 Exploring Intrinsic Pleasantness 
Intrinsic Pleasantness is an unusual appraisal because its value is independent of 
the current task.  Another way to look at this is that it reflects long-term learning or an 
evolutionary adaptation to treat certain stimuli as always good or bad.  For example, 
someone on a diet may still find cake to be Intrinsically Pleasant because of the rewards it 
has consistently provided in the past (or because evolution has made us inherently desire 
high-energy foods).  Our model does not attempt to learn values for Intrinsic 
Pleasantness, but it does allow us to explore the effects of Intrinsic Pleasantness values 
for various stimuli on behavior and learning. 
As with Goal Relevance, we can either just allow Intrinsic Pleasantness to 
influence intensity, or we can use value boosting.  Unlike Goal Relevance, as a valenced 
appraisal, Intrinsic Pleasantness also influences valence (until now, valence was entirely 
determined by Conduciveness).  This makes intuitive sense (consider the cake example), 
and is what motivated us to make the circumplex-inspired changes described earlier.  
Additionally, Intrinsic Pleasantness does not share underlying values with other 
appraisals like Goal Relevance did, so we don’t expect there to be inherent conflict like 
there was between Goal Relevance and Conduciveness.  Finally, value boosting for 
Intrinsic Pleasantness requires the development of additional theory; for example, what 
do we do with negative values?  Do we still allow Intrinsic Pleasantness to influence 
valence but not intensity?  Or do we allow both?  Thus, to keep things simple, we decided 
to explore Intrinsic Pleasantness without value boosting. 
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9.8.1 Intrinsic Pleasantness Results 
The experimental conditions are exactly as reported earlier, with a cutoff of 20000 
and 15 episodes.  The Conduciveness Outcome Probability and Discrepancy from 
Expectation appraisals are still enabled, but Goal Relevance is not.  Intrinsic Pleasantness 
influences feeling intensity and valence as described earlier. 
For this experiment, we gave blocks an Intrinsic Pleasantness value of 1.0 
(everything else was neutral).  This means that the valence generated for a block stimulus 
will have a strong positive bias.  This will interact with the Conduciveness value, which 
will either reinforce that bias, or counteract it.  Depending on the situation, this may have 
positive or negative effects on the agent’s learning and behavior.  For example, in many 
cases, Attending to a block will ultimately be a good thing, as this is necessary in order to 
get blocks into the storage room.  In these cases, boosting the valence of the block will 
help the agent learn more quickly that this is a good thing to do.  However, there are other 
cases where Attending to a block is the wrong thing to do.  For example, if the agent is 
already carrying a block, or if the block is in the storage room, then Attending to the 
block is a distraction.  When Conduciveness was the only input to valence, the block 
would have had a negative valence in these situations.  However, with Intrinsic 
Pleasantness, these may end up having a positive or neutral valence.  This may make it 
more difficult for the agent to learn not to do those things.  In fact, there may be new 
reward cycles because of the increase in positive valence.  If so, the agent may still be 




Figure 9.15: Decision cycles to task completion for Intrinsic Pleasantness experiment. 
The agent learns across episodes, but doesn’t do as well in the third quartile. 
 
 
Figure 9.16: Total reward accumulated during task for Intrinsic Pleasantness experiment.  The agent 
learns to get more reward across episodes. 
The third quartile here appears to correspond to the third quartile in the decision cycles, implying 















































Figure 9.17: Fraction of predictions made that are correct for Intrinsic Pleasantness experiment. 
The agent learns to improve its predictions across episodes. 
 
 
Figure 9.18: Failures across trials for each episode for Intrinsic Pleasantness experiment.   
Failures remain fairly flat. 
 
Final Episode Failures Trial Failures Total Failures 
7 23 90 
Table 9.9: Failures for Intrinsic Pleasantness experiment. 





















































In terms of decision cycles (Figure 9.15), the agent does fairly well in the first two 
quartiles, but not the third.  The third quartile probably represents cases in which the 
agent had more trouble with conflicted events (where Conduciveness and Intrinsic 
Pleasantness have conflicting values).  Even in the first two quartiles, the agent does less 
well in comparison to an agent without Intrinsic Pleasantness (Figure 9.4); it starts and 
finishes higher (note the scales on the two graphs are different).  This is to be expected, 
though, given that Intrinsic Pleasantness can sometimes conflict with Conduciveness.  
The total reward (Figure 9.16) tells a similar story.  The third quartile seems to indicate 
that the agent found some reward cycles (hence the spike in the middle), which would 
explain why the third quartile for the decision cycles is so much higher. The agent also 
learns to make better predictions (Figure 9.17).  Compared to an agent without Intrinsic 
Pleasantness (Figure 9.6), the agent actually starts better but ends worse.  The early 
success could be a reflection of early cyclical behavior (i.e., the agent learning to predict 
bad cycles) or that the agent learns to pick up blocks faster.  The slightly worse prediction 
performance at the end is just a reflection of the conflict between Intrinsic Pleasantness 
and Conduciveness.  Finally, the agent has many failures (Figure 9.18 and Table 9.9), but 
learns to recover from most of them at the very end.  Thus, while there were cycles the 
agent was able to learn to overcome them.  That is, they were not infinite in that negative 
reward from later stimuli eventually overcame the positive bias.  Furthermore, the 
repetition inherent in cyclical behavior would have reduced the feeling intensity due to 
the interaction between Outcome Probability, Discrepancy from Expectation, and the 
episodic memory. 
Thus, we see an interesting interaction between Intrinsic Pleasantness and the 
task—they can sometimes conflict, but learning is able to overcome these issues.  In other 
tasks, it may be that Intrinsic Pleasantness is always helpful or always conflicting, in 
which case we would expect to see more extreme results (either good or bad).  However, 
in order for this appraisal to make functional sense, the net effect should be positive.  
Thus, further exploration into this appraisal should be conducted in the future. 
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9.9 Additional Experiments 
There were at least two experiments we wanted to conduct with the revised 
system that are not directly related to specific appraisals; the purpose of these 
experiments was to explore extensions to the model.  First, we wanted to explore whether 
mood has the same positive effect here as it did in the Eaters domain.  Second, in all of 
these experiments so far, the learning and exploration rates were constant.  This may have 
prevented the system from achieving its full potential because it may not have been able 
to converge properly, and exploration may have forced it to make some bad moves.  We 
explored whether emotion can be used to modulate these aspects of reinforcement 
learning. 
9.9.1 Mood 
We tested mood with Conduciveness, Outcome Probability, and Discrepancy 
from Expectation enabled, with many different values for the decay and movement rates 
(results not shown).  We hypothesized that mood would essentially propagate values 
forward to new states, giving them better initial values.  Unfortunately, mood seemed to 
have virtually no impact on the agent (results not shown); the results are nearly identical 
to the agent under the same conditions without mood.  The only difference is that the 
scale of the total rewards is much larger (the max is higher and the min is lower).  This is 
not surprising because, with mood, the agent is getting non-zero rewards all the time, not 
just in the couple decision cycles between Attend and Intend.  Still, the shape of the 
rewards is the same. 
We speculate that the reason mood has no impact in this domain may be because 
of the domain itself, or the reduced noise (e.g., fewer and higher quality appraisals), or 
possibly an unexpected impact of one of the many changes we made to the agent.  While 
this is essentially a negative result, it is also worth noting that mood did not have a 
negative impact on the agent.  Clearly, further exploration is required here in the future. 
9.9.2 Dynamic Exploration Rate 
Traditional reinforcement learning systems usually decrease exploration rate in a 
fixed way (e.g., linear across actions or episodes).  While this approach may work for 
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agents in fixed domains, we find this approach unsatisfactory for a system that aspires to 
be general, since the agent can never know how many actions or episodes it has left for 
any given task. 
Wilson (1996) describes several exploration strategies, grouping them into global 
strategies (e.g., constant rate, descending function of time, or statistical measurements of 
properties like reward or error over time) and local strategies (e.g., statistical 
measurements of properties relating to the current input).  Work by Hogewoning (2007), 
mentioned earlier, is a global strategy that automatically adjusts exploration rate based on 
statistical analysis of long-term and short-term rewards over time.  This strategy requires 
keeping a history of rewards.  Furthermore, they assume the agent is using Boltzmann 
action selection, whereas we are using epsilon greedy. 
We tried a couple of simpler approaches based on the agent’s feeling intensity and 
valence.  The idea is that if the feeling valence is positive, then things are probably going 
well, so exploration rate is set to 0.  If the feeling valence is negative, then things could 
probably be going better, so the exploration rate is set to the absolute value of the reward 
(feeling intensity multiplied by feeling valence).  That is, the worse things are (in terms 
of both intensity and valence), the higher the exploration rate.  The exploration rate 
naturally falls in the [0,1] range with this setup.  If mood is disabled, this is a local 
exploration strategy (since it is determined by the current stimulus only).  If mood is 
enabled, then this is essentially a hybrid global/local strategy since the agent’s current 
feeling is a combination of its emotion (which is about the current stimulus) and its mood 
(which is about recent stimuli). 
Below we show the results with emotion only.  Conduciveness, Outcome 
Probability and Discrepancy from Expectation are enabled.  The cutoff is set at 10000 
decision cycles (so these results are directly comparable to those in Figure 9.4, Figure 
9.5, Figure 9.6 and Table 9.3). 
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Figure 9.19: Decision cycles to task completion for Dynamic Exploration experiment. 
Compared to the agent without Dynamic Exploration, this agent takes slightly fewer decision cycles. 
 
 
Figure 9.20: Total reward accumulated during task for Dynamic Exploration experiment. 

















































Figure 9.21: Fraction of predictions made that are correct for Dynamic Exploration experiment. 
Compared to the agent without Dynamic Exploration, this agent learns to be much more accurate. 
 
 
Figure 9.22: Failures across trials for each episode for Dynamic Exploration experiment.   
Early failures are more erratic but settle at a constant level. 
 
Final Episode Failures Trial Failures Total Failures 
4 19 69 
Table 9.10: Failures for Dynamic Exploration experiment. 






















































Figure 9.23: Decision cycles to task completion with and without Dynamic Exploration (medians).   
With Dynamic Exploration, the agent learns slightly faster and better. 
 
 
Figure 9.24: Total reward accumulated during task with and without Dynamic Exploration 
(medians).   

















































Figure 9.25: Fraction of predictions made that are correct with and without Dynamic Exploration 
(medians).   
The agent with Dynamic Exploration learns much faster and better. 
 
With Dynamic Exploration, the agent’s performance generally improved.  The 
change in decision cycles was small, but the agent does seem to converge more quickly 
(Figure 9.19 and Figure 9.23).  The total reward peaked a little earlier, and reduced more 
(Figure 9.20 and Figure 9.24).  This was not surprising given the pronounced 
improvement in prediction accuracy (about 15% at the end, with a faster initial climb; 
Figure 9.21 and Figure 9.25).  The implication was that exploration rate did in fact reduce 
over time, and that the agent converged to consistent good behavior. 
Where the agent did not improve is in failures (Figure 9.22 and Table 9.10).  
Whereas before the agent had no failures, it now had many (although still few final 
failures, implying it usually recovers).  The cause for this was probably those cases where 
the agent had a small negative reward.  Still, the fact that failures settle at a constant level 
implies that the agent’s exploration rate lowers and that the agent has settled into a 
consistent pattern of behavior.  The agent could probably do better, but the small 
magnitude means the exploration rate in these situations is very low.  In essence, the 
agent was locked into this bad behavior for a long time.  The only way to break out was 



































would take a long time given the small magnitude), or to “get lucky” enough times to 
find a better option.  Still, as the quartiles in the other results show, these failures are 
outside the norm. 
With mood enabled, the agent’s performance (not shown) matched the above 
results.  Given that mood had no impact on the agent without Dynamic Exploration, this 
is not surprising. 
9.9.3 Dynamic Learning Rate 
As with exploration rate, traditional reinforcement learning systems typically 
change learning rate in a fixed way, and we found this unsatisfactory for the same reasons 
as above. 
As with Dynamic Exploration Rate, we tried tying the learning rate to the agent’s 
feeling intensity and valence.  In situations where the agent has strong feelings, the 
implication is that there is more to learn, whereas when feelings are weak, there is less to 
learn.  Thus, Dynamic Learning Rate was defined as the absolute value of the feeling 
intensity multiplied by the feeling valence (that is, the absolute value of the reward). 
There may be an interesting interaction between learning rate and episodic 
memory (via the Outcome Probability and Discrepancy from Expectation appraisals).  
For example, when the agent first learns about something particularly good, it should 
learn a lot about it, but as it repeats that action many times, the feeling intensity goes 
down.  However, with Dynamic Learning Rate, the learning rate will go down, too, 
which will effectively lock in a higher value.  Thus, this value will not go down to zero 
over time, so the agent should never “unlearn” the higher value.  Additionally, if the 
agent ever makes a bad exploratory move, it should get a large negative penalty (since it 
is unexpected) and that should come with a high learning rate, helping the agent to learn 
about negatively valued actions quickly. 
We performed experiments with Conduciveness, Outcome Probability, and 
Discrepancy from Expectation enabled.  The agent learned across 15 episodes with a 
10000 decision cycle cutoff. 
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In all cases, the results for number of decision cycles, total reward, and fraction 
correct predictions are virtually identical to the same conditions without Dynamic 
Learning Rate, and thus these are not shown.  Instead, we focus on the failures. 
In the first experiment, we simply enabled Dynamic Learning Rate.  This matched 
the original results obtained with a fixed learning rate (Table 9.3); that is, there were no 
failures. 
In the next experiment, we enabled both Dynamic Learning Rate and Dynamic 
Exploration Rate.  This time, the agent performed much better (Figure 9.26 and Table 
9.11), than with Dynamic Exploration alone (Figure 9.22 and Table 9.10), but still more 
than zero.  However, the data show that all failures occurred early; once some initial 
learning took place, agent never failed.  
 
Figure 9.26: Failures across trials for each episode for Dynamic Learning and Exploration 
experiment.   
Some early failures but none in later episodes. 
 
Final Episode Failures Trial Failures Total Failures 
0 4 4 
Table 9.11: Failures for Dynamic Learning and Exploration experiment. 




















Finally, we tried Dynamic Learning and Exploration with mood enabled.  The 
agent performed slightly worse under this condition (Figure 9.27 and Table 9.12).  This 
may be variability in the data (since mood has previously had no effect), or it may be that 
mood, in effect, actually introduces a little bit of noise.  The fact that the failures are more 
spread out across episodes supports the noise explanation, although the agent was still 
able to recover by the end. 
 
Figure 9.27: Failures across trials for each episode for Dynamic Learning and Exploration 
experiment with mood.   
Failures are more spread out across episodes. 
 
Final Episode Failures Trial Failures Total Failures 
0 7 7 
Table 9.12: Failures for Dynamic Learning and Exploration experiment with mood. 
The agent had slightly more failures than without mood. 
 
9.10 Summary 
Our goal was twofold.  First, we wanted to demonstrate that the system was still 
capable of learning in a complex, continuous environment.  Second, we wanted to 
explore how various appraisals influenced that learning, in an attempt to tease apart the 



















For the first point, the agent was clearly able to learn in the new domain.  This 
was repeatedly demonstrated in our experiments used to address the second point.  For 
the second point, we chose a subset of five appraisals (the rest were disabled).  We tested 
Conduciveness alone, which was generally successful but suffered from some failures.  
Next, we introduced Outcome Probability and Discrepancy from expectation.  The values 
for these were tied to the system’s prediction ability, which was enhanced with an 
episodic memory.  This resulted in zero failures.  This setup with Conduciveness, 
Outcome Probability, Discrepancy from Expectation, and the episodic memory was used 
as a base for the remaining experiments. 
To this base we first added Goal Relevance via a boosting mechanism, which 
almost did too well.  We argued that this did not obviate the need for the other appraisals, 
and reinforced this with a second experiment with reduced knowledge, which 
demonstrated that learning still takes place.  Next we added Intrinsic Pleasantness to the 
base.  This took the form of positive valence for blocks.  As expected, the results were 
mixed, but overall the agent did well and learned to recover from negative situations.  We 
also explored mood in the context of the base model, but found that it had no impact.  
Finally, we tried dynamically changing the exploration and learning rates.  Dynamic 
Exploration rate had a generally positive effect, but resulted in more failures.  By itself, 
Dynamic Learning Rate had no effect, but when combined with Dynamic Exploration 
Rate, it retained the benefits of Dynamic Exploration while also reducing failures.  An 
important takeaway from these dynamics experiments is that emotion was able to 
regulate another part of the cognitive architecture with positive results. 
Table 9.13 summarizes the key points for each of the experiments we ran. 
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Introduced episodic memory for generating predictions as basis 
for generating values for these appraisals.  Agent learns to 
predict better over time.  Also results in much improved failure 
rates. 
Goal Relevance Used to “boost” value of proposed Attend operators.  Agent 
does extremely well (except for failures), to the point where it 
almost isn’t learning, raising questions about the value of other 
appraisals.  Knowledge about Goal Relevance was reduced, 
leading to more learning. 
Intrinsic 
Pleasantness 
Used to provide a task-independent bias on valence.  Results 
are mixed, as expected, but agent generally learns to overcome 
problems. 





Emotion was used to regulate another part of the cognitive 
architecture.  Dynamic Exploration Rate resulted in tighter 
convergence and better prediction accuracy, but more failures.  
Dynamic Learning Rate had no impact alone (e.g., failures 
were still zero), but combined with Dynamic Exploration, 
retained the benefits of Dynamic Exploration while reducing 
failures. 
Table 9.13: Summary of experiments and key takeaway points from the results. 
 
Finally, we want to summarize our contributions to reinforcement learning.  We 
connected emotion, mood and feeling to reinforcement learning by hypothesizing the use 
of feeling as an intrinsically motivating reward signal (Chapter 7).  In this context, mood 
provides a time-averaging effect over reward, allowing rewards to be generated in states 
that lack external stimuli.  This method of generating reward worked in both discrete and 
continuous environments (Chapters 7-9).  In the continuous case, we introduced a method 
for skipping over temporal gaps between RL states as caused by impasses and non-
learned processing (section 8.3.4).  Finally, we demonstrated how aspects of the emotion 
system can be used to manipulate aspects of the reinforcement learning system; 




Summary, Future Work, and Conclusion 
 
In summary, we have presented an integration of cognition and emotion, in which 
each side provides a functional necessity to the other: cognition (as PEACTIDM) 
provides the processes necessary to generate emotions (via appraisals), whereas emotion 
(via appraisals) provides the data which cognition (via PEACTIDM) processes.  On top 
of this theoretical grounding, we extended the Soar cognitive architecture to include the 
computational mechanisms necessary to support our proposed integration.  
This integration was realized in a Soar model of the simple choice response task 
(Chapter 3).  This model demonstrated that cognition and emotion both provided insights 
about each other, including new mechanisms for cognitive architectures and 
representations for emotions, including active appraisal frames, the appraisal detector, 
and emotion intensity. We also touched on human data. 
To explore further, we then extended the model to an ongoing task in the artificial 
Eaters environment (Chapter 4).  For this domain, we expanded the set of appraisals the 
model generated.  The new domain also introduced many new issues, such as creation of 
subtasks and long-term influences of emotion.  The later led us to propose a model of the 
interaction between emotion, mood and feeling.  We also demonstrated a connection 
between emotion and behavior (in both directions), including the temporal dynamics, in 
our evaluation of this model (Chapter 5). 
Work in this non-learning model begged the question: what are the functional 
benefits of emotion?  In response to this question, we proposed that it may serve as an 
intrinsic motivator (that is, internal reward signal) for reinforcement learning (Chapter 7).  
Our verification of this began with an extension of the non-learning model so that it could 
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learn in the same simple Eaters domain.  This was successful: the agent was able to 
improve its performance in the domain.  However, the complexity of the system made it 
difficult to tell how various aspects of the model actually contributed to its performance.  
Additionally, we wanted to explore how the model would scale to a more complex 
domain. 
To explore these issues, we introduced the Room domain, which has continuous 
time and space properties.  The model was revised in several ways to deal with this new 
domain, including changes in knowledge and refinements to the way various aspects 
worked (Chapter 8).  To explore performance in this new environment (Chapter 9), we 
enabled only a subset of appraisals in various configurations.  We also introduced a new 
episodic memory mechanism to better support the generation of predictions and the 
associated Outcome Probability and Discrepancy from Expectation appraisals.  We 
demonstrated that each of the selected appraisals influences the agent’s learning and 
behavior, usually positively. We also explored mood in this domain, but with negative 
results.  Finally, we looked at using feelings to dynamically modulate exploration and 
learning rates.  This resulted is generally improved performance. 
There are vast, overlapping areas we have yet to explore.  One goal is to expand 
to a more complete model of emotion, including its integration with the rest of cognition 
and physiology.  This expansion will likely provide additional constraints to help shape 
our theory, and our theory may provide additional constraints on the theories in these 
areas. For example, how we represent appraisals and emotion may be influenced by these 
other areas, and vice versa.  Besides these areas, we will also discuss scalability, and 
validation.  
Beyond our very abstract mood model, the system has no notion of physiology.  
Physiology plays critical roles in action tendencies (Frijda et al., 1989), non-verbal 
communication such as facial expression (Ekman, et al., 1987) and tone of voice, and 
other more basic physiological measures such as skin conductance, heart rate, and blood 
pressure.  Once a more complete physiological model is in place, we can also explore 
introspection about the current physiological state, for example, which may extend to 
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emotion recognition (Picard, 1997).  Basic drives such as hunger and thirst can also be 
explored in the context of emotion. 
On the cognitive side, we have scratched the surface of learning, but that remains 
a major area for continued research.  For example, we have not yet explored how 
appraisal values might be learned.  We also need to explore how emotion interacts with 
other cognitive mechanisms; for example, the episodic and semantic memories depicted 
in Figure 2.2.  Such a system could allow phenomena ranging from priming effects 
(Neumann, 2001) to emotional intelligence (Picard, 1997) to be explored.  While we did 
scratch the surface of actually allowing emotion to influence decision making, clearly 
there is much more to be done there as well. 
We demonstrated that the system can scale to a more complex environment with 
more complex appraisal value generation.  But there is also the matter of simply 
generating more appraisals; for example, what about socially oriented appraisals?  Does 
the system scale to explaining aspects of social interaction and culture? 
Finally, there is the issue of validation.  There are multiple ways in which we 
might attempt to validate the system going forward: believability (Neal Reilly, 1996), 
human data (which we explored briefly), physiological measures, behavior, and decision 
making (Gratch et al., 2006), and functionality (e.g., learning, which we have already 
started to explore, the impact of additional appraisals, etc.). 
This partial list demonstrates the vast amount of work remaining; it seems 
unlikely that anything short of a complete human intelligence system can actually address 
it all.  Indeed, this is perhaps a key point that emotion researchers have been making for a 
long time: emotion is a key aspect of human-level intelligence. 
In conclusion, our system has several features and implications, which we list 
below.  For ease of understanding, we have included the list we presented earlier (section 
5.3) and extended it here: 
1. Appraisals are a functionally required part of cognitive processing; they cannot be 
replaced by some other emotion generation theory. 
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2. Appraisals provide a task-independent language for control knowledge, although 
their values can be determined by task-dependent knowledge.  Emotion and mood, 
by virtue of being derived from appraisals, abstract summaries of the current and 
past states, respectively.  Feeling, then, augments the current state representation 
with knowledge that combines the emotion and mood representations and can 
influence control. 
3. The integration of appraisal and PEACTIDM implies a partial ordering of 
appraisal generation. 
4. This partial ordering specifies a time course of appraisal generation, which leads 
to time courses for emotion, mood and feeling.   
5. Emotion intensity is largely determined by expectations and consequences for the 
agent; thus, even seemingly mundane tasks can be emotional under the right 
circumstances. 
6. In general, appraisals may require an arbitrary amount of inference to be 
generated.  That is, the theory supports Marsella & Gratch’s (in press) distinction 
between appraisal and inference. 
The following are additions to the original list: Internal and external stimuli are treated 
identically. 
8. Circumplex models can be synthesized from appraisal models: they provide a 
description of the emotion generated by appraisal. 
9. Reinforcement learning is driven by intrinsically generated rewards based on the 
agent’s feeling. 
10. Mood averages reward over time, allowing states with no reward-invoking 
stimulus to still have a reward associated with them.  This leads to improved 
learning in some cases. 
11. The system scales to continuous time and space environments.  Changes made to 
support this include adding a temporal gap jump to reinforcement learning to 
allow rewards to propagate back through non-RL states. 
12. Each appraisal contributes to the agent’s performance. 
13. Reinforcement learning parameters can be influenced by the current emotional 
state, resulting in improved performance. 
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Emotion has become an active area of research in recent years.  We hope this 
thesis makes a meaningful contribution to this area, and reminds researchers in both the 
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